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Wrong About the Right: How Courts 
Undermine the Fair Cross-Section Guarantee 
by Confusing It with Equal Protection 
Nina W. Chernoff* 
This Article exposes a surprising doctrinal distortion that has unfolded since the Supreme 
Court first established the Sixth Amendment standard for the right to a jury selected from 
a fair cross-section of the community. A significant number of courts are erroneously 
applying the test for a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection 
guarantee to Sixth Amendment claims. As a result, criminal defendants are being 
deprived of the unique Sixth Amendment fair cross-section right, which encompasses 
more than just protection from discrimination. 
 
Under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant need not allege that any state actor 
discriminated in the jury selection process. Instead, a defendant can establish a prima 
facie violation by showing that the underrepresentation of a distinctive group in the jury 
pool is inherent in the selection process, whether by accident or design. The equal 
protection clause, in contrast, demands evidence of discriminatory intent. 
 
This Article reveals that at least ten federal circuits and nineteen states have erroneously 
denied defendants’ Sixth Amendment claims for failure to satisfy the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s discrimination requirement. This Article also uses an original survey of 
federal and state cases to explore the potential scope of the problem. In over one-third of 
the relevant cases, courts denied defendants’ fair cross-section claims for failing to meet 
equal protection standards. 
 
In contrast to scholarship arguing that the underpinnings of the fair cross-section 
standard need to be revisited, this Article asserts that the key to enforcing the cross-section 
guarantee is not to change the standard, but to apply it consistently with the Sixth 
Amendment and Supreme Court doctrine. 
 
 * Associate Professor, CUNY School of Law. I am tremendously grateful for the insights and 
encouragement of Tony Thompson, Kim A. Taylor-Thompson, Erin E. Murphy, Louis Michael Seidman, 
Katie Tinto, Anna Roberts, Lily Shapiro, Teddy Rave, Jamila Wideman, Dr. Jay Kadane, the members of 
the NYU Lawyering Scholarship Colloquium, and the late, brilliant, Jonathan Souweine. I am also 
thankful for the research assistance of Jared Davidson and Ganaraj Hegde, as well as Whitney Flanagan 
and Krystan Hitchcock. 
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Introduction 
Sixth Amendment doctrine is currently evolving in contravention of 
the Constitution and Supreme Court case law. The Sixth Amendment 
does not require a defendant challenging racial underrepresentation in 
the jury system to show evidence of discrimination. Yet courts across the 
country have denied claims with holdings like this one: “Because 
appellant has failed to demonstrate systematic discrimination, we reject 
his Sixth Amendment claim.”1 
This Article demonstrates that federal and state courts have 
improperly imported the discrimination requirement of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause into Sixth Amendment analysis 
and are using this contaminated standard to reject criminal defendants’ 
claims.2 As a result, defendants are being deprived of the unique 
protections of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury selected from a fair 
cross-section of the community. 
Under the Sixth Amendment, a person on trial for a criminal 
offense has a constitutionally protected interest in “having the judgment 
of his peers interposed between himself and the officers of the State who 
prosecute and judge him.”3 As the drafters of the Constitution 
recognized—and the Supreme Court has consistently reinforced—a jury 
made up of community members acts as an “inestimable safeguard,” 
screening out prosecutions that result from the malice, mistakes, or 
apathy of government officials.4 The Supreme Court has accordingly 
concluded that the Sixth Amendment “necessarily contemplates an 
impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community.”5 
 
 1. State v. Jones, 744 N.E.2d 1163, 1173 (Ohio 2001) (emphasis added). 
 2. The Fourteenth Amendment applies only to states, but the Fifth Amendment is directly 
applicable to the federal government and contains an equal protection component. Bolling v. Sharpe, 
347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). In this Article, references to the equal protection guarantee of the 
Fourteenth Amendment should be read as encompassing the counterpart right in the Fifth 
Amendment. See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 542 n.21 (1987) 
(“This Court’s approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has . . . been precisely the same 
as to equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.” (quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 
420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975)) (alteration in original)). 
 3. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 411 (1972); see also Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 
308 (1879) (“The very idea of a jury is a body of men composed of the peers or equals of the person 
whose rights it is selected or summoned to determine . . . .”). 
 4. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 
(1968)). See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131, 
1183 (1991); Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role in an Era 
of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 33, 46–65 (2003). 
 5. Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946); see also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 
(1975) (“[T]he selection of a petit jury from a representative cross section of the community is an 
essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.”). 
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The fair cross-section standard reflects the Court’s recognition 
that—separate and independent from the harm of discrimination—the 
absence of any distinctive group in the community “deprives the jury of a 
perspective on human events” that may be critical to evaluating a 
criminal case.6 It is the community’s judgment against which the 
government’s claims are to be tested. When juries are not selected from a 
fair cross-section of the community and thus fail to fairly and reasonably 
represent distinctive groups in the community like African-Americans 
and Hispanics, the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial 
jury is violated. Representative juries, moreover, are critical to public 
confidence in the justice system.7 
The Court established the standard for a violation of the fair cross-
section right in the 1979 case of Duren v. Missouri.8 Under Duren, a 
criminal defendant alleging a cross-section violation must satisfy a three-
prong prima facie test by showing that (1) “the group alleged to be 
excluded [from the jury system] is a ‘distinctive’ group in the 
community,”9 (2) “the representation of this group in venires from which 
juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of 
such persons in the community,”10 and (3) “this underrepresentation is 
due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.”11 
“Systematic” means “inherent in the particular jury-selection process 
utilized” and does not require evidence of intentional exclusion.12 
The Sixth Amendment fair cross-section guarantee is distinct from 
the Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws. The 
Equal Protection Clause protects against discrimination by state actors.13 
It does not protect the broader interest in reasonable representation in 
the jury pool; it is limited to the narrower goal of prohibiting 
discrimination.14 That “distinction is important. An Equal Protection 
challenge concerns the process of selecting jurors, or the allegation that 
 
 6. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503–04 (1972). 
 7. See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530 (“Community participation [is] . . . critical to public confidence in 
the fairness of the criminal justice system.”); see also Leslie Ellis & Shari Seidman Diamond, Race, 
Diversity, and Jury Composition: Battering and Bolstering Legitimacy, 78 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1033, 1049 
(2003). 
 8. 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id.; see also Berghuis v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 1382, 1388 (2010). 
 12. Duren, 439 U.S. at 366; see also id. at 371 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[U]nder Sixth 
Amendment analysis intent is irrelevant . . . .”). 
 13. See infra Part I. 
 14. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986) (“[T]he central concern of the . . . Fourteenth 
Amendment was to put an end to governmental discrimination on account of race.”). 
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selection decisions were made with discriminatory intent. The Sixth 
Amendment, on the other hand, is concerned with impact . . . .”15 
When defendants claim that their jury was selected in violation of 
the Sixth Amendment fair cross-section right, they are frequently 
objecting to the systematic exclusion of African-Americans and 
Hispanics,16 and their claims are usually denied.17 The most 
straightforward conclusion to draw from the consistency of the denials is 
that people of color are fairly and reasonably represented in jury 
selection systems in proportion to their population in communities. But 
there are at least two reasons to explore this Article’s alternative 
hypothesis that courts are erroneously bestowing constitutional seals of 
approval on systems that fail to satisfy the Sixth Amendment and the 
Duren standard. 
First, some skepticism may be in order where courts consistently 
conclude that the representation of people of color is “fair and 
reasonable” when research demonstrates—just as consistently—that 
African-Americans and Hispanics are underrepresented in jury systems 
across the county. Indeed, federal and state courts “throughout the 
country have found minority underrepresentation in jury composition, 
most notably in the makeup of the jury pool from which the jury 
 
 15. United States v. Green, 389 F. Supp. 2d 29, 51 (D. Mass. 2005) (emphasis omitted), overruled 
on other grounds by In re United States, 426 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005); see infra Part I.B.3. The scope of 
the two standards also differs: Equal protection extends to would-be jurors who are denied the 
opportunity to serve on juries by discriminatory state actors, while the Sixth Amendment protects only 
criminal defendants. See infra Part I. 
 16. In my survey, for example, discussed infra Appendix, 84 of 167 cases (74%) alleged the 
exclusion of African-Americans and/or Hispanics. For that reason, this Article focuses on the 
underrepresentation of African-Americans and Hispanics, although the fair cross-section right applies 
to women, Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537 (1975), and may also apply to other distinctive 
groups, see, e.g., United States v. Yazzie, 660 F.2d 422, 426 (10th Cir. 1981) (holding that Native 
Americans are a distinct group). Claims regarding the exclusion of African-Americans and Hispanics 
also seem particularly salient because those two groups are otherwise overrepresented in the criminal 
justice system. See United States v. Pion, 25 F.3d 18, 27 (1st Cir. 1994) (Torruella, J., concurring) 
(“[T]he true distortion of ‘reality’ is the failure of the criminal system, before which is tried a large 
number of persons from an ethnic group, to include within its mechanisms the peers of those charged, 
at least in some reasonable measured proportion to their membership in the population.”). 
 17. See, e.g., Sanjay K. Chhablani, Re-Framing the ‘Fair Cross-Section’ Requirement, 13 U. Pa. J. 
Const. L. 931, 948 (2011) (“[D]efendants have had little success in federal courts raising Sixth 
Amendment claims that the juries in their cases were selected from venires that did not reflect a ‘fair 
cross-section’ of the community. The same has been true for claims raised in state courts across the 
country.” (footnote omitted)); Paula Hannaford-Agor, Systematic Negligence in Jury Operations: Why 
the Definition of Systematic Exclusion in Fair Cross Section Claims Must Be Expanded, 59 Drake L. 
Rev. 761, 797 (2011) (“[T]he overwhelming majority of fair, cross section claims have failed . . . .”); 
Robin E. Schulberg, Katrina Juries, Fair Cross-Section Claims, and the Legacy of Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co., 53 Loy. L. Rev. 1, 18 (2007) (“[J]ury selection systems . . . have been virtually immune 
from challenge, even if African-Americans were persistently underrepresented on venires.”). The data 
from my own survey are consistent with the literature. See infra Part II. 
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ultimately is selected.”18 Not every disparity is of constitutional 
magnitude, nor does any particular statistic prove that a case is wrongly 
decided. But the consistency of data that courts themselves have 
produced, contrasted with the consistency of the outcome of fair cross-
section claims, invites scholarly scrutiny. 
Second, a closer look at fair cross-section claims is also warranted 
because some courts, even while denying defendants’ claims, have 
admitted to being disturbed by the evidence of racial disparities in jury 
systems. For example, courts have acknowledged that the claims they are 
denying demonstrate “real problems with the representation of African-
Americans on our juries, and the crisis of legitimacy it creates,”19 and 
describe the evidence of underrepresentation as “disquieting,”20 
“troubling,”21 and “worthy of concern.”22 Some courts have gone further, 
 
 18. State Justice Inst., The Neb. Minority & Justice Task Force, Final Report 17 (2003) 
(“[M]any researchers have found that this is ‘the rule’ rather than the exception.”); see, e.g., Fla. 
Supreme Court Racial & Ethnic Bias Comm’n, “Where the Injured Fly for Justice”: Reforming 
Practices Which Impede the Dispensation of Justice to Minorities in Florida 13 (Deborah Hardin 
Wagner ed. 1991) (“The present system of selecting jurors . . . does not result in juries which are racial 
and ethnic composites of the community.”); Paula L. Hannaford-Agor & G. Thomas Munsterman, 
Nat’l. Ctr. for State Courts, Third Judicial Circuit of Michigan Jury System Assessment i (2006) 
(“[T]he proportion of African-Americans in the . . . jury pool was approximately half of what was 
expected given their representation in the community.”); Minn. Supreme Court Task Force on 
Racial Bias in the Judicial Sys., Final Report 32 (1993) (“[J]ury pools rarely are representative of 
the racial composition of our communities.”); Pa. Supreme Court Comm. on Racial & Gend. Bias in 
the Justice Sys., Final Report 54 (2003) (“[Jury selection policies] fail at each step of the process to 
include a representative number of minorities.”); S.D. Equal Justice Comm., Final Report and 
Recommendations 8 (2006) (“Juries in South Dakota rarely represent the racial composition of a 
community.”); N.Y. State Judicial Comm’n on Minorities, Report of the New York State Judicial 
Commission on Minorities, 19 Fordham Urb. L.J. 181, 242 (1992) (“Minorities are significantly 
underrepresented on many juries in the court system.”); see also Alaska Supreme Court Advisory 
Comm. on Fairness & Access, Report 83 (1997); Ga. Supreme Court Comm’n on Racial & Ethnic 
Bias in the Court Sys., Let Justice Be Done: Equally, Fairly, and Impartially 182 (1995); Ohio 
Comm’n on Racial Fairness, Report 34 (1999); Or. Supreme Court Task Force on Racial/Ethnic 
Issues in the Judicial Sys., Report 73 (1994); J. Clark Kelso, Final Report of the Blue Ribbon 
Commission on Jury System Improvement, 47 Hastings L.J. 1433, 1476 (1996). 
 19. United States v. Green, 389 F. Supp. 2d 29, 80 (D. Mass. 2005). 
 20. United States v. Royal, 174 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 1999) (describing the statistics offered 
regarding the representation of African-Americans as “disquieting” and the jury system at issue as “a 
situation leaving much to be desired”); see State v. Tremblay, No. P1 97-1816AB, 2003 WL 23018762, 
at *15 (Sup. Ct. R.I. Mar. 19, 2003) (finding the material presented by the defendant “unsettling” and 
“disquieting”). 
 21. United States v. DeFries, 129 F.3d 1293, 1301 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“The import of appellants’ 
evidence is troubling . . . and . . . the statistical disparities, if supported by [additional evidence], could 
support an inference that a jury venire was not composed of a fair cross-section of the community.”); 
see Diggs v. United States, 906 A.2d 290, 299 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“[T]he allegations concerning hardship 
deferrals and the Monday composition of the jury pool are ‘troubling’ . . . .” (quoting DeFries, 129 F.3d 
at 1301 n.5)). 
 22. United States v. Shine, 571 F. Supp. 2d 589, 599 (D. Vt. 2008); see People v. Currie, 87 Cal. 
App. 4th 225, 235 (2001) (“[U]nderrepresentation of African-Americans on . . . jury venires . . . is a 
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urging the jury office to take remedial actions, notwithstanding the 
courts’ conclusions that such steps are not required.23 In one illustrative 
case, a court denied a cross-section challenge to racial disparity in the 
jury system, and then devoted six pages to a discussion of possible 
remedies for the problem of racial disparity in that system.24 The 
discussion was prompted by “this basic fact: . . . African Americans are 
consistently and pervasively underrepresented in [the jurisdiction’s] 
juries, from one year, and one jury wheel, to the next.”25 Occasionally 
courts have even mandated changes to the jury system while still holding 
that there was no Sixth Amendment violation.26 
 
long-standing problem.”); Commonwealth v. Tolentino, 663 N.E.2d 846, 851 (Mass. 1996) 
(“[Evidence] does not negate totally the possibility that jury venires . . . do not adequately reflect the 
racial and ethnic composition of the county populations.”); State v. Williams, 525 N.W.2d 538, 544 
(Minn. 1994) (“[T]he evidence—both anecdotal and statistical—indicates that there is some 
underrepresentation in fact.”); State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 239 (N.J. 1987) (“[T]he results are still 
far from optimal. Greater representativeness on the jury panels is obviously desirable.”). 
 23. Sometimes these suggestions are articulated as stern warnings. See, e.g., Williams, 525 N.W.2d 
at 544 (“[W]e will not be satisfied until both the reality and the perception of underrepresentation of 
African-Americans and other distinct minority groups are eliminated.”); United States v. Reyes, 934 F. 
Supp. 553, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“[S]erious consideration should be given to amending the jury 
selection procedures . . . .”); United States v. Hernandez-Estrada, No. 10cr0558 BTM, 2011 WL 
1119063, at *12 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (“The District should [inter alia] give serious consideration to . . . 
supplement[ing] voter registrations lists with DMV lists to increase inclusiveness and provide better 
representation of the jury-eligible population.”). In other cases they are framed as encouragement. 
See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 73 F.3d 774, 777 n.2 (8th Cir. 1996) (“This author . . . encourages the 
[jurisdiction] to consider modifying its jury selection plan to increase minority representation in its jury 
pools.”); Tremblay, 2003 WL 23018762, at *15 (“[I]t would be appropriate for [the jurisdiction] to 
consider instituting further measures in their ongoing efforts to increase jury participation . . . by inner 
city minority residents.”); Ramseur, 524 A.2d at 239 (“Jury officials should undertake the 
improvements suggested by this record, if practical and fair . . . .”). Other cases frame these 
suggestions as gentle reminders that changes could help serve important purposes. See, e.g., Royal, 
174 F.3d at 12 (“[This jurisdiction] may wish to consider whether taking additional steps that are 
responsive to the issues that [the defendant] has identified . . . would serve the goals of ‘assurance of a 
diffused impartiality,’ encouragement of ‘public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice 
system,’ and ‘civil [sic] responsibility.’” (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530–31 (1975))); 
Tolentino, 663 N.E.2d at 852 (“[T]he office of jury commissioner should . . . address[] the problems 
with jury selection . . . . This court believes that such actions are essential to ‘increas[ing] confidence in 
the jury system [and] enhanc[ing] the appearance [and the reality] of fairness’ in our trial system.” 
(quoting Commonwealth v. Bastarache, 414 N.E.2d 984, 995 (Mass. 1980)) (alterations to quoted text 
in original)).  
 24. United States v. Bates, No. 05-81027, 2009 WL 5033928, at *16–22 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 15, 2009). 
 25. Id. at *17–18 (“Jury Department records also confirm . . . that African Americans are 
chronically underrepresented in the Court’s jury pools.”). 
 26. See, e.g., Shine, 571 F. Supp. 2d at 602 (“That [the] jury selection system meets statutory and 
constitutional minima does not terminate the discussion . . . . [T]he next Plan should be 
amended . . . .”); Washington v. People, 186 P.3d 594, 596 (Colo. 2008) (holding the system was 
constitutional but disapproving of it and directing it be stopped immediately because it “resulted in a 
statistically significant underrepresentation of African-American and Hispanics on jury panels”); 
Williams, 525 N.W.2d at 544 (“We intend to use our supervisory power over the trial courts to insure 
that the systems used are increasingly inclusive in the hope that the faces of the people in the jury 
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Judicial expressions of concern are not proof that the cases are 
wrongly decided,27 but they raise troubling questions in the context of a 
standard that recognizes that representative jury systems protect 
defendants and contribute to public acceptance of jury verdicts. There is 
some tension between the conclusion that the system has produced a jury 
pool that is “fair and reasonable,” and a description of disparity in that 
same system as “a serious problem.”28 That tension has led to expressions 
of frustration by judges who either feel “that compliance with 
Constitutional standards is not enough” to ensure that people of color 
are adequately represented on juries,29 or think that there is “something 
seriously amiss in the jury selection process” before them but feel limited 
to insisting that any system that produces such results “certainly needs 
further examination.”30 
The premise of this Article is that further examination is indeed 
called for where courts consistently reject challenges to jury systems that 
have been recognized as racially underrepresentative by state entities, 
and are occasionally prompted to issue directives to fix the very system 
they have just affirmed. This Article undertakes that examination and 
 
room will soon mirror the faces of the people in the community at large.”); State v. Elbert, 424 A.2d 
1147, 1150 (N.H. 1981) (“[B]lacks are [not] presently underrepresented to an unconstitutional extent 
by systematic exclusion. However, because the system has the potential for such exclusion . . . , we now 
order that, pursuant to our administrative authority . . . [the manner of selection for] all future jury 
lists [must be changed] . . . .”). 
 27. See, e.g., Royal, 174 F.3d at 12 (“There is a difference between what violates the law and what, 
while not in violation, is still a situation leaving much to be desired.”). 
 28. Commonwealth. v. Estes, 851 A.2d 933, 936 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 2004) (“[U]nderrepresentation of 
African-Americans in our jury pools is a serious problem which must be corrected.”). If judges (or 
jurors) are not comfortable with the representation of people of color in the jury system, how 
comfortable should we expect defendants and the public to be? See, e.g., United States v. Neighbors, 
590 F.3d 485, 490–91 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting a prospective juror, sitting on a panel that contained no 
African-Americans, who said, “If I were sitting in the defendant’s chair, I might be a little concerned 
that we’re all rather light skinned over here, and isn’t it supposed to be a jury of your peers?”); United 
States v. Rogers, 73 F.3d 774, 775 (8th Cir. 1996) (“[A]ll eighty-nine [summoned jurors] were white. At 
oral argument, Rogers’ counsel urged our court to consider the difficulty of convincing an African-
American client that the system that produced this jury pool is fair.”); Stephanie Domitrovich, Jury 
Source Lists and the Community’s Need to Achieve Racial Balance on the Jury, 33 Duq. L. Rev. 39, 45–
46 (1994) (“Trial judges who have had the opportunity to talk with jurors after they have rendered 
their verdicts are frequently faced with the popular question of why not even one black juror was 
called for service in an African-American defendant’s trial.”). 
 29. Bates, 2009 WL 5033928, at *21; see also Rogers, 73 F.3d at 777 (constrained from finding a 
prima facie case due to circuit precedent, despite finding that the defendant’s data “establish, at a 
minimum, a prima facie case that blacks are being systematically excluded from jury service”); United 
States v. Green, 389 F. Supp. 2d 29, 37 (D. Mass 2005) (“[Previous jury challenges have been] 
unsuccessful, largely because of the rigorous standards imposed by the courts, including the First 
Circuit. While others have criticized those standards, including judges on this Court, I have no choice 
but to apply them.”). 
 30. Sanders v. State, 776 S.W.2d 334, 336 (Ark. 1989) (Purtle, J., concurring) (“I concur only 
because I do not have time to research this issue in depth.”). 
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exposes the extent to which courts are misapplying the Duren test by 
allowing Fourteenth Amendment equal protection standards to 
contaminate the Sixth Amendment analysis, a phenomenon that has 
gone largely unacknowledged in the literature.31 I reject the suggestion 
that compliance with the constitutional standard is insufficient to protect 
the right of defendants to a jury selected from a fair cross-section of the 
community, and instead argue that the underwhelming track record of 
the fair cross-section right stems from courts’ routine importation of 
equal protection standards into the analysis. In making this argument I 
part ways with scholars who, although recognizing that the fair cross-
section standard has been an ineffectual tool for alleviating racial 
disparity in jury systems,32 have responded by proffering alternative 
constructions of the fair cross-section right,33 or alternative legal 
frameworks to evaluate the problem of underrepresentative juries.34 In 
contrast, this Article asserts that the anemic application of the Sixth 
Amendment guarantee results—not from weaknesses in the 
underpinnings of the right or the test for enforcing it—but from a 
consistent judicial failure to actually apply the unadulterated Sixth 
Amendment standard as articulated in Duren. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I examines the intertwined 
history and development of the Fourteenth and Sixth Amendment 
 
 31. Surprisingly little scholarship has considered the ways in which the fair cross-section standard 
has been compromised by the encroachment of equal protection concepts. For a thoughtful exception, 
see Schulberg, supra note 17, at 3 (asserting that “fair cross-section claims often lose because judges 
confuse them with equal protection claims” and suggesting borrowing lessons from disparate impact 
law); see also Melissa K. Gee, Note, A Jury Drawn from a Fair Cross-Section of the Community—A 
Fading Memory?: People v. Sanders, 26 U.S.F. L. Rev. 785, 792 (1992) (examining the importation of 
equal protection requirements into two California cases). The articles that have explored the issue 
have largely focused on the importation of equal protection standards into the discrete question of 
which groups are cognizable under the fair cross-section test. See infra note 75. The problem has also 
been highlighted by a few judges, as discussed in Part II infra. 
 32. See, e.g., Chhablani, supra note 17, at 945 (describing fair cross-section jurisprudence as 
“largely inefficacious”); Andrew D. Leipold, Constitutionalizing Jury Selection in Criminal Cases: A 
Critical Evaluation, 86 Geo. L.J. 945, 949 (1998) (“[T]he cross-section requirement has been 
interpreted by lower courts in a way that makes the doctrine nearly irrelevant.”). 
 33. See Chhablani, supra note 17, at 933 (proposing “an alternate construction of the ‘fair cross-
section’ requirement, grounding the jurisprudence in the Sixth Amendment’s vicinage clause”); 
Leipold, supra note 32, at 949, 960 (providing “an alternative explanation for the cross-section 
requirement” because “the articulated rationale for the doctrine leaves much to be desired”); Richard 
M. Re, Note, Re-Justifying the Fair Cross Section Requirement: Equal Representation and 
Enfranchisement in the American Criminal Jury, 116 Yale L.J. 1568, 1570 (2007) (proposing “an 
enfranchisement conception of jury legitimacy” as a new justification for the fair cross-section right). 
 34. See Schulberg, supra note 17, at 4 (arguing that disparate impact law “could correct mistakes 
in the fair cross-section jurisprudence”); Paula Hannaford-Agor, Systematic Negligence in Jury 
Operations: Why the Definition of Systematic Exclusion in Fair Cross Section Claims Must Be 
Expanded, 59 Drake L. Rev. 761, 764 (2011) (proposing “a negligence theory of jury system 
management”). 
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standards. It then identifies the critical distinctions between the two 
constitutional tests, as well as reasons why courts may be confusing them. 
Part II explores the manner in which equal protection standards 
have been erroneously imported into the third prong of Duren’s prima 
facie test: whether underrepresentation of a distinctive group is “due to 
systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.”35 This 
Part demonstrates that courts in at least ten federal circuits and nineteen 
states have improperly adopted the equal protection requirement to 
demonstrate intentional discrimination—a standard that has no basis in 
Sixth Amendment law. Additional courts have made the more subtle 
mistake of importing equal protection’s focus on the culpability and 
choices of jury administrators and potential jurors, rather than the effect 
of those choices on the rights of defendants. 
Part III examines the nature of the harm engendered by the 
application of the wrong standard. First, limiting the scope of the fair 
cross-section right to the more narrow confines of equal protection 
jurisprudence deprives defendants of their substantive Sixth Amendment 
rights that are distinct from the right to be free from discrimination. 
Second, an analysis focused on intent fails to take into account both the 
unintentional ways in which modern day jury systems produce racially 
underrepresentative jury pools and the real ways jury systems affect 
ostensibly private choices. Finally, this stark constitutional error 
undermines the integrity of the doctrine, particularly because no court 
has acknowledged or explained the adoption of equal protection 
requirements. The Article concludes that the key to enforcing the 
impartial jury guarantee for criminal defendants is not to change the 
Duren test, but to apply it consistently with the demands of the Sixth 
Amendment and Supreme Court doctrine. 
I.  Fair Cross-Section and Equal Protection: Overlapping 
Development but Two Distinct Tests 
A. Overlapping Development but Different Purposes 
The historical relationship between equal protection and fair cross-
section doctrine reveals two points that are critical for understanding 
why courts might be confusing the two standards and why that confusion 
is so problematic. 
First, while the right to an impartial jury of one’s peers was firmly 
established at the time of America’s founding, the modern version of the 
fair cross-section challenge was not established until 1975, when the 
Court explicitly recognized in Taylor v. Louisiana that “the selection of a 
 
 35. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). 
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petit jury from a representative cross-section of the community is an 
essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.”36 Up 
until 1975, the Supreme Court had primarily relied on the Equal 
Protection Clause when evaluating the constitutional requirements for 
racially representative juries, and intertwined Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendment doctrine when discussing the fair cross-section right. This 
doctrinal entanglement and historical predominance of the Equal 
Protection Clause may explain in part why courts are importing equal 
protection concepts into the Sixth Amendment test today. 
Second, the Court’s decision in Taylor establishing the fair cross-
section guarantee as a distinct Sixth Amendment right solidified the 
distinctions between the two constitutional provisions, which serve 
different purposes, guarantee different rights, and protect different 
people. This explicit delineation by the Supreme Court helps illustrate 
why it is so critical that courts not confuse the two constitutional tests. 
1. Doctrinal Entanglement and the Predominance of  
Equal Protection 
The constitutionality of racially representative juries has historically 
been addressed through the lens of equal protection.37 African-
Americans were recognized as part of the community for jury purposes 
only with the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868,38 and for 
the next 100 years, overt and explicit discrimination in jury selection was 
routine, such that claims about racial disparity in jury selection were 
inevitably claims about racial discrimination in jury selection.39 It was 
arguably unnecessary for the Court to consider the exact implications of 
the Sixth Amendment’s impartial jury guarantee, because discriminatory 
jury selection fell so neatly into the jurisdiction of the Equal Protection 
Clause. Moreover, until 1968, the Court had not determined that the 
Sixth Amendment was applicable to the states.40 
 
 36. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975). 
 37. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 478 (1990) (“[R]acial groups cannot be excluded from the 
venire from which a jury is selected. That constitutional principle was first set forth not under the Sixth 
Amendment but under the Equal Protection Clause.”); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 500 n.9 (1972) 
(“The principle of the representative jury was first articulated by this Court as a requirement of equal 
protection . . . .”). 
 38. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879). 
 39. See, e.g., Mark McGillis, Jury Venires: Eliminating the Discrimination Factor by Using a 
Statistical Approach, 3 How. Scroll Soc. Just. L. Rev. 17, 20–21 (1995) (“The first cases addressing 
[the issue of racial composition of jury venires and the resulting jury] involved facially discriminatory 
statutes . . . . Consequently, racial exclusion was evident and not at issue. The issue in these early 
cases . . . was whether such complete exclusion was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 40. See Toni M. Massaro, Peremptories or Peers?—Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doctrine, 
Images, and Procedures, 64 N.C. L. Rev. 501, 536 (1986) (“Until the sixth amendment was deemed to 
be incorporated into the fourteenth amendment in 1968, the Court likely saw no other constitutional 
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The civil rights movement and accompanying social changes in the 
1960s began to curtail explicit and public acts of discrimination by jury 
officials.41 This trend was manifested and advanced by the passage of the 
Jury Service and Selection Act (“JSSA”) in 1968, an explicit legislative 
effort to combat discriminatory jury selection.42 One provision of the 
JSSA prohibited exclusion based on race or ethnicity, creating a 
statutory parallel to the Equal Protection Clause.43 But another provision 
included a requirement that federal juries be selected from a “fair cross 
section of the community,”44 and “some members of Congress acted on 
the belief (or at least argued to their colleagues) that the Sixth 
Amendment imposed [the fair cross-section] requirement.”45 
At the same time—and perhaps influenced by the passage of the 
JSSA46—the Supreme Court woke the Sixth Amendment’s impartial jury 
right from its slumber. Six weeks after the JSSA was passed in 1968, the 
Court incorporated the Sixth Amendment, making it applicable to the 
states.47 In 1975 the Court established the fair cross-section right as “an 
essential component of the Sixth Amendment” in Taylor.48 And in 1979 
the Court established the test for a fair cross-section violation in Duren.49 
The impartial jury guarantee and the idea of a fair cross-section right had 
essentially lain dormant for 100 years while the Equal Protection Clause 
 
text that would allow it to correct the patent and egregious violation of the rights of black male 
citizens.”). 
 41. See Leland Ware, A Comparative Analysis of Unconscious and Institutional Discrimination in 
the United States and Britain, 36 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 89, 96 (2007). 
 42. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861–78 (2006); see Jon M. Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures: Our 
Uncertain Commitment to Representative Panels 86 (1977). 
 43. 28 U.S.C. § 1862. 
 44. Id. § 1861. Courts generally identify the test for evaluating a fair cross-section violation as the 
same under either the Sixth Amendment or the JSSA. See, e.g., United States v. Royal, 174 F.3d 1, 10–
11 (1st Cir. 1999). Similarly, many states use the same standard for alleged violations of state 
constitutions, see, e.g., State v. Bowman, 509 S.E.2d 428, 434 (N.C. 1998) (applying the Duren standard 
to claims under the state and federal constitutions). In addition, both the JSSA and state statutory 
equivalents have requirements that can be violated even in the absence of a cross-section problem. See 
28 U.S.C. § 1867; see, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-71-139 (2001). This Article addresses the JSSA only to 
the extent that it influences the constitutional analysis. 
 45. Leipold, supra note 32, at 957. 
 46. The Court in Taylor gave a nod to the legislators who had anticipated the recognition of the 
constitutional right. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975) (“Recent federal legislation 
governing jury selection within the federal court system has a similar thrust.”); id. at 530 (“Debate on 
the floors of the House and Senate on the Act invoked [inter alia] the Sixth Amendment . . . .”); see 
Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 212 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring) (citing, inter alia, the JSSA and 
stating that “[t]he Congress, state courts, and state legislatures have moved forward with the 
advancing conception of human rights in according procedural as well as substantive rights to 
individuals accused of conflict with the criminal laws”). 
 47. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). 
 48. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 528. 
 49. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). 
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was employed to combat discriminatory jury selection, but at the time 
when discrimination was becoming less overt and the need for a fair 
cross-section guarantee may have been exposed, the Court revitalized 
the Sixth Amendment right in the course of a decade with the Duncan-
Taylor-Duren trio. 
This shift created a new avenue for litigating racial disparity in the 
jury system—independent of the question of discrimination.50 But the 
language of the new standard reflected the original doctrinal 
entanglement. Taylor established that the “fair cross-section” language 
was now explicitly a Sixth Amendment concept. Before 1975, however, 
the Supreme Court had affirmed the importance of a jury selected from a 
“fair cross section of the community” not just in Sixth Amendment 
cases,51 but also in the application of the Court’s supervisory powers52 and 
in equal protection claims.53 The “systematic exclusion” language that is 
part of the third prong of the Duren test for a fair cross-section violation 
is also intertwined with equal protection doctrine. The term was 
originally used in equal protection cases where groups had been 
“intentionally and systematically” or “purposeful[ly] and 
systematic[ally]” excluded54 and is still used that way today.55 The 
Supreme Court borrowed the language of “systematic exclusion” for fair 
 
 50. Leipold, supra note 32, at 947 (“[Following Taylor,] [c]ourt officials no longer had a duty just 
to avoid intentional discrimination when calling citizens for jury service; now they had to ensure that 
no ‘distinctive group’ was significantly underrepresented in the jury pool.”). 
 51. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (indicating that, pursuant to the Sixth 
Amendment, number of jurors must be sufficient to “provide a fair possibility for obtaining a 
representatives cross-section of the community”). 
 52. See Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) (“The American tradition of trial by jury, 
considered in connection with either criminal or civil proceedings, necessarily contemplates an 
impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community.”); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 
86 (1942) (“[T]he proper functioning of the jury system, and, indeed, our democracy itself, requires 
that the jury be a ‘body truly representative of the community’ . . . . [that] comport[s] with the concept 
of the jury as a cross-section of the community.”); see also Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 192 
(1946) (quoting Thiel, 328 U.S. at 220). 
 53. See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 500 (1972) (“[T]he exclusion of a discernible class from jury 
service . . . destroys the possibility that the jury will reflect a representative cross section of the 
community.”); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 412 (1972) (citing “the principle that the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires jury panels to reflect a cross section of the community”); Carter v. Jury Comm’n 
of Greene Cnty., 396 U.S. 320, 332–33 (1970) (“[We need not delineate] the proper source of jury lists, 
so long as the source reasonably reflects a cross-section of the population suitable in character and 
intelligence for that civic duty.”); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 474 (1953) (“[S]ource[s] of jury 
lists . . . [should] reasonably reflect[] a cross-section of the population suitable in character and 
intelligence for that civic duty.”); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 409 (1945) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“If 
a jury is to be fairly chosen from a cross section of the community it must be done without limiting the 
number of persons of a particular color, racial background or faith . . . .”). 
 54. The Supreme Court first used the phrase to describe jury systems in the 1930s that implicated 
equal protection. See Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 354 (1939); Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 600, 
601 (1935). 
 55. See, e.g., Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 276 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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cross-section purposes, and adapted it by dropping the intentional and 
purposeful language.56 The overlapping language reflects the doctrines’ 
overlapping roots and, together with the historical predominance of 
equal protection doctrine, may be part of the reason modern courts 
confuse the two standards. 
2. Supreme Court Recognition of Distinct Purposes and Analytical 
Focus 
After the Court’s decision in Taylor, the fair cross-section right was 
exclusively tied to the Sixth Amendment (rather than the equal 
protection guarantee or courts’ supervisory powers), and the Sixth 
Amendment’s impartial jury guarantee was now explicitly a right to a 
jury selected from a fair cross-section of the community (not just a jury 
selected by non-discriminatory means or a jury made up of unbiased 
individuals). Equal protection continued to be the basis for claims 
alleging the intentional exclusion of people of color in jury systems, but 
Taylor and Duren served to break the Equal Protection Clause’s quasi-
monopoly on the issue of race and the jury. 
This separation of the Sixth Amendment from the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s focus on discrimination was consistent with the 
recognition that the two constitutional provisions serve different 
purposes, guarantee different rights, and protect different people. The 
Fourteenth Amendment was enacted in 1866 by Union legislators 
anticipating the return to Congress of representatives of the Confederate 
states.57 The Union congressmen were troubled by the Confederate 
states’ discriminatory Black Codes, so as a condition of rejoining the 
union—and thus regaining congressional representation—the Union 
required Confederate states to agree to the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and its guarantee that no state would deny a citizen “the 
equal protection of the laws.”58 The Equal Protection Clause was thus 
adopted as a direct attack on discriminatory practices and was explicitly 
 
 56. The immediate path of the term “systematic exclusion” into the fair-cross action analyses can 
be traced through the progression of the Court’s decisions in Ballard, Taylor, and Duren. In Ballard 
the Court exercised its supervisory power to correct “the purposeful and systematic exclusion of 
women from the panel in this case.” 329 U.S. at 193. Then in Taylor, the Court borrowed the term 
“systematic” from Ballard, but eliminated the reference to internal or purposeful exclusion. Taylor v. 
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531 (1975) (“We are also persuaded that the fair-cross-section requirement is 
violated by the systematic exclusion of women . . . .”). Finally, in Duren the Court incorporated 
Taylor’s “systematic exclusion” language to establish the fair cross-section standard. Duren v. 
Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 358–59 (1979) (citing Taylor, 419 U.S. at 526–31, 538). 
 57. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights 162 (1998); Michael Kent Curtis, No State 
Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights 35–36 (1986). 
 58. Amar, supra note 57, at 162; Curtis, supra note 57, at 35–36. 
Chernoff_19 (S. ALESSI) (Do Not Delete) 12/19/2012 3:05 PM 
December 2012]        UNDERMINE FAIR CROSS-SECTION GUARANTEE 155 
 
designed to prohibit discriminatory acts.59 Moreover, equal protection 
jurisprudence conceives of the harm of discrimination as extending 
beyond a criminal defendant to the community and the excluded jurors.60 
As a result, jurors have standing to object to equal protection violations61 
in civil as well as criminal proceedings.62 The guarantee is not limited to 
criminal defendants. 
In contrast, the Sixth Amendment was ratified almost 100 years 
earlier in 1791, not to prevent discrimination, but to place a check on the 
government’s power to use the criminal law to deprive a citizen of life 
and liberty.63 The right is not just to a jury selected without the taint of 
discrimination, but to a jury selected from a fair cross-section of the 
community.64 The Sixth Amendment, moreover, is concerned only with 
the defendant’s right to the judgment of the community and does not 
extend to the community’s right to participate in that judgment.65 
 
 59. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1879) (“The true spirit and meaning of the 
amendments . . . cannot be understood without keeping in view the history of the times when they 
were adopted, and the general objects they plainly sought to accomplish. . . . It was well known that in 
some States laws making such discriminations then existed, and others might well be expected. . . . 
[African-Americans] especially needed protection against unfriendly action in the States where they 
were resident. It was in view of these considerations the Fourteenth Amendment was framed and 
adopted.” (citation omitted)); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 81 (1872) (“The existence of laws in 
the States where the newly emancipated negroes resided, which discriminated with gross injustice and 
hardship against them as a class, was the evil to be remedied by this [equal protection] clause, and by it 
such laws are forbidden.”). 
 60. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 49 (1992) (“[T]he harm from discriminatory jury selection 
extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire community.” 
(quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986))). 
 61. See Carter v. Jury Comm’n of Greene Cnty., 396 U.S. 320, 329 (1970) (“Defendants in 
criminal proceedings do not have the only cognizable legal interest in nondiscriminatory jury selection. 
People excluded from juries because of their race are as much aggrieved as those indicted and tried by 
juries chosen under a system of racial exclusion.”). 
 62. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614, 617 (1991). 
 63. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968) (“A right to jury trial is granted to criminal 
defendants in order to prevent oppression by the Government.”); Amar, supra note 57, at 215 (“The 
original Bill [of Rights] also focused centrally on empowering the people collectively against 
government agents following their own agenda. The Fourteenth Amendment, by contrast, focused on 
protecting minorities against . . . majoritarian government.”). 
 64. See United States v. Armsbury, 408 F. Supp. 1130, 1140 (D. Or. 1976) (“The very philosophy 
and purpose of the Sixth Amendment require that I focus on the issue of a fair cross section and not 
on the issue of discrimination.”); Laurie Magid, Challenges to Jury Composition: Purging the Sixth 
Amendment Analysis of Equal Protection Concepts, 24 San Diego L. Rev. 1081, 1111 (1987) (“The 
primary goal of the constitutional guarantee to equal protection of law is to protect groups from 
invidious discrimination. . . . The primary goal of the fair cross-section requirement is to provide the 
individual defendant with a fair and impartial jury as required by the sixth amendment.”); Schulberg, 
supra note 17, at 3 (“[T]he two claims protect different values. Whereas the Equal Protection Clause 
prohibits discrimination, the fair cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment defines the type 
of jury to which criminal defendants are entitled: a jury drawn from a representative pool.”). 
 65. Berghuis v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 1382, 1387 (2010) (“The Sixth Amendment secures to criminal 
defendants the right to be tried by an impartial jury drawn from sources reflecting a fair cross section 
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The analytical focus of the constitutional protections is accordingly 
different.66 Because the injury the Fourteenth Amendment protects 
against is discriminatory intent (manifested in action), it follows that the 
question of whether a cognizable injury has occurred is focused on 
identifying a discriminatory person or policy.67 The injury the Sixth 
Amendment protects against, however, is an outcome, whether achieved 
“by accident or design,”68 so the question of whether a cognizable injury 
has occurred is focused on identifying the existence of a particular 
outcome.69 
B. Distinct Constitutional Tests 
Because the two constitutional provisions serve different purposes, 
and have a different analytical focus, the Supreme Court has crafted 
distinct tests to implement their guarantees. The tests are structurally 
similar, in that the moving party has the burden to establish a three-
pronged prima facie case, which in turn shifts the burden to the 
government. The substantive requirements needed to establish each of 
 
of the community.”); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 297 (1930) (“[T]he framers of the 
Constitution simply were intent upon preserving the right of trial by jury primarily for the protection 
of the accused.”). 
 66. Darryl K. Brown, The Means and Ends of Representative Juries, 1 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 445, 
463 (1994) (“The Sixth Amendment . . . instead of requiring claimants to prove exclusion of certain 
citizens was the primary purpose of jury officials, focuses on the impact that selection procedures have 
on the jury pool and panel.”). 
 67. See United States v. Grisham, 63 F.3d 1074, 1081 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[W]hereas the inquiry in a 
fair cross-section claim focuses on the representativeness of the jury venire, the focus of an equal 
protection claim is whether members of a discrete group have been intentionally denied the 
opportunity to serve on a jury.”); Schulberg, supra note 17, at 27–28 (“The Equal Protection Clause 
prohibits intentional discrimination but does not assure equal outcomes. Hence, judges thinking in 
equal protection terms look for wrongdoing.”). 
 68. Anaya v. Hansen, 781 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1986) (Bownes, J., concurring); see also Leipold, 
supra note 32, at 998 (noting the harm in a fair cross-section claim to be the “depriv[ation] . . . of a 
community perspective the legislature has said should be taken into account” as a result of “excluding 
distinctive groups from the jury pool”). 
 69. See United States v. Gelb, 881 F.2d 1155, 1161 (2d Cir. 1989) (“While the equal protection 
clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits underrepresentation of minorities in juries by reason of 
intentional discrimination, [t]he sixth amendment is stricter because it forbids any substantial 
underrepresentation of minorities, regardless of . . . motive.” (alterations in original) (citation omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Smith v. Commonwealth, 649 N.E.2d 744, 746 (Mass. 1995) 
(“[T]he inquiry does not focus on the jury selection process itself, but instead focuses on the result of 
the process using an analysis of the process. Thus, if exclusion of a particular group arises as a result of 
the system by which potential jurors are chosen, that exclusion is ‘systematic.’”); Brown, supra note 65, 
at 463 (“The Sixth Amendment . . . instead of requiring claimants to prove exclusion of certain citizens 
was the primary purpose of jury officials, focuses on the impact that selection procedures have on the 
jury pool and panel.”); Schulberg, supra note 17, at 29 (“The value protected by the Sixth Amendment 
is a criminal defendant’s right not to be deprived of his liberty except by an impartial jury of his peers. 
Hence, it does not matter why an aspect of the jury selection process filters out the group. What 
matters is that the group is systematically filtered out.”). 
Chernoff_19 (S. ALESSI) (Do Not Delete) 12/19/2012 3:05 PM 
December 2012]        UNDERMINE FAIR CROSS-SECTION GUARANTEE 157 
 
these prongs, however, are quite different. Likewise, the two provisions 
proceed differently when a prima facie case has been established, 
imposing different burdens on the government if it is to defeat the 
infringement claim. 
1. Differences in Scope 
The tests differ substantively because the two constitutional 
standards differ in scope. The Sixth Amendment fair cross-section right 
applies only in criminal cases, as it belongs exclusively to a criminal 
defendant.70 The Equal Protection Clause, in contrast, applies in both 
civil and criminal cases and extends to all litigants and potential jurors.71 
In addition, the Equal Protection Clause applies to the process of voir 
dire and prohibits discrimination in the selection or strikes of jurors.72 
The Sixth Amendment, however, guarantees a defendant a jury selected 
from a fair cross-section of the community; it does not guarantee a jury 
that actually includes a fair cross-section of the community.73 
The fair cross-section right applies to the first three stages of the 
four-step jury selection process:74 (1) assembling a pool of potential 
jurors from source lists, such as the list of registered voters; 
(2) assembling a pool of qualified jurors (by identifying members of the 
pool of potential jurors who are eligible for jury service); and 
(3) assembling the jury venires (made up of members of the pool of 
qualified jurors who are summoned and arrive at the courthouse) from 
which twelve-person panels are selected.75 But it does not apply to the 
final steps in the process, that is, the creation of twelve-person panels 
through the voir dire process.76 In sum, the Sixth Amendment guarantees 
a defendant the next best thing to a petit jury that represents a cross-
 
 70. See supra note 65. 
 71. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 128 (1994) (“[W]hether the trial is criminal or 
civil, potential jurors, as well as litigants, have an equal protection right to jury selection procedures 
that are free from state-sponsored group stereotypes rooted in, and reflective of, historical 
prejudice.”); supra notes 60 and 61. 
 72. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86–87 (1986). 
 73. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173 (1986). 
 74. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1974) (“Defendants are not entitled to a jury of 
any particular composition, but the jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires from which juries 
are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail to be 
reasonably representative thereof.” (citation omitted)); see also Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 174 (“The point 
at which an accused is entitled to a fair cross-section of the community is when the names are put in 
the box from which the panels are drawn.” (quoting Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710, 725 (8th Cir. 
1967) (Blackmun, J.))). 
 75. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 173 (“We have never invoked the fair-cross-section principle to 
invalidate the use of either for-cause or peremptory challenges to prospective jurors, or to require 
petit juries, as opposed to jury panels or venires, to reflect the composition of the community at 
large.”). 
 76. Id. 
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section: a “fair possibility for obtaining a representative cross-section of 
the community.”77 
2. Differences in Identifying the Group in Question 
The constitutional standards share, as the first prong of their test, a 
requirement that the moving party identify a particular group that is not 
sufficiently represented. For equal protection purposes, the movant must 
identify a “recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different treatment 
under the laws, as written or as applied.”78 The emphasis on “different 
treatment” reflects the equal protection focus on discrimination, and has 
accordingly been interpreted to require evidence that the group has 
historically experienced discrimination.79 
In a fair cross-section case, “the group alleged to be excluded [must 
be] a ‘distinctive’ group in the community.”80 The group’s historical 
experience of discrimination is not relevant.81 The extent to which courts 
have imported equal protection standards into Duren’s first prong is not 
addressed here, but that problem has been identified and explored by 
other scholars.82 
 
 77. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (emphasis added). This limitation is arguably 
confusing because many of the justifications for a jury selected from a fair cross-section are premised 
on ideas about how important it is for the petit jury to be representative. See Duren v. Missouri, 
439 U.S. 357, 371 at n.* (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The Court has explained that “[t]he limited 
scope of the fair-cross-section requirement is a direct and inevitable consequence of the practical 
impossibility of providing each criminal defendant with a truly ‘representative’ petit jury.” Lockhart, 
476 U.S. at 173–74. More importantly, the limitation stakes out a compromise position in the “struggle 
to increase minority representation without abandoning principles of color-blind justice in favor of 
quotas and racial balancing.” Jeffrey Abramson, We, the Jury: The Jury System and the Ideal of 
Democracy 107 (1994). 
 78. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977). 
 79. See, e.g., Parker v. Phillips, 717 F. Supp. 2d 310, 335 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Standards under fair 
cross-section requirements and the equal protection clause differ somewhat in that fair cross-section 
‘distinctiveness’ encompasses the broader principle that juries should be drawn from a source fairly 
representative of the community, whereas equal protection focuses upon classes which have 
historically been discriminatorily excluded or substantially underrepresented based upon race or 
national origin, etc.”). 
 80. Duren, 439 U.S. at 364 (“Taylor without doubt established that women ‘are sufficiently 
numerous and distinct from men’ . . . [to satisfy] the Sixth Amendment’s fair-cross-section 
requirement . . . .” (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531 (1974))); see also Lockhart v. 
McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174 (1986) (“[T]he concept of ‘distinctiveness’ must be linked to the purposes of 
the fair-cross-section requirement.”). 
 81. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bastarache, 414 N.E.2d 984, 992 (Mass. 1980) (“The focus of the 
equal protection clause has been on classes that have historically been saddled with disabilities or 
subjected to unequal treatment. . . . Central to the Sixth Amendment, on the other hand, is the 
broader principle that juries should be drawn from a source fairly representative of the community.”). 
 82. See Chhablani, supra note 17, at 947 (“[O]ver time courts have largely conflated the scope of 
the Cross-Section Clause with the Equal Protection Clause. Specifically, lower courts have treated the 
‘distinct group’ requirement of the cross-section requirement as identical to the ‘suspect class’ 
requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); see also Mitchell S. Zuklie, Rethinking the Fair Cross-
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3. Differences in Measuring Disparity 
Both tests have a second prong that seeks to measure the degree of 
disparity between the proportion of the group in the community and the 
proportion of that group in the jury system, but the standards for 
measuring that disparity are different. 
In an equal protection claim, the movant must show “substantial 
underrepresentation” of the group in question.83 The disparity needs to 
be “sufficiently large” such that “it is unlikely that it is due solely to 
chance or accident, and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, one 
must conclude that racial or other class-related factors entered into the 
selection process.”84 The question of “substantial underrepresentation” is 
also evaluated in equal protection cases in light of whether the jury 
employs race-neutral polices.85 Because the question is whether the 
system discriminated, a borderline disparity figure looks more troubling 
if the system uses subjective selection policies, and less worrisome if the 
polices are objective and race-neutral.86 
In contrast, it is irrelevant to a Sixth Amendment claim whether jury 
selection policies are race-neutral or whether the disparity is substantial 
enough to indicate discrimination. As the Court announced in Duren, 
“systematic disproportion itself demonstrates an infringement of the 
defendant’s interest in a jury chosen from a fair community cross 
section.”87 Because the disparity figure in a fair cross-section case is not 
being used as evidence of discrimination, it does not need to be 
 
Section Requirement, 84 Calif. L. Rev. 101, 132 (1996) (“[Courts] conflate[] two distinct inquires: 
‘distinctiveness’ under the Sixth Amendment with ‘suspectness’ under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”); Magid, supra note 64, at 1083 (“The two chief limitations on equal 
protection claims that have been applied improperly to fair cross-section claims are those related to 
standing and to the definition of what constitutes a group whose exclusion cannot be permitted.”). 
 83. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494. 
 84. Id. at 494 n.13 (emphasis added). In that context—where the disparity figure is serving as 
evidence of discrimination—the Supreme Court employed a threshold of 10% disparity for showing 
“purposeful discrimination” in the 1965 case of Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208–09 (1965) (“We 
cannot say that purposeful discrimination based on race alone is satisfactorily proved by showing that 
an identifiable group in a community is underrepresented by as much as 10%.”). Although the “Court 
has never announced mathematical standards for the demonstration of ‘systematic’ exclusion” in the 
context of an equal protection claim, Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 630 (1972), it has never 
revisited the 10% threshold it opined on in Swain for equal protection claims, and lower courts have 
continued to evaluate equal protection claims pursuant to that figure.  
 85. See Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494 (“[A] selection procedure that is susceptible of abuse or is not 
racially neutral supports the presumption of discrimination raised by the statistical showing.”). 
 86. Id. at 495 n.14 (“[T]he presumption of purposeful discrimination [is] created by the combined 
force of the statistical showing and the highly subjective method of selection.”). 
 87. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 at 368 n.26 (1979). Specifically, the defendant must compare 
“the percentage of the community made up of the group” with the “representation of this group in 
venires from which juries are selected.” Id. at 364 (“The second prong of the prima facie case was 
established by petitioner’s statistical presentation.”). 
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substantial enough to indicate discrimination—it simply has to fail to be 
“fairly representative of the local population otherwise eligible for jury 
service.”88 
Just as evidence indicating purposeful exclusion is irrelevant to a 
Sixth Amendment analysis, so too are the race-neutral policies employed 
by a jury office. A policy that would allow jury administrators to consider 
the race of prospective jurors could be a red flag in an equal protection 
case where the specter of discrimination has been raised. But in cross-
section claims, the question of whether underrepresentation is “fair and 
reasonable” involves only a comparison of the group’s representation in 
the community and on the jury venires.89 
There is evidence that courts are importing equal protection 
principles into Duren’s second prong by erroneously importing the equal 
protection disparity threshold,90 imposing the “substantial 
underrepresentation” requirement,91 and by incorrectly evaluating the 
 
 88. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537 (1975). See, e.g., Washington v. People, 186 P.3d 594, 
602 n.6 (Colo. 2008) (“By requiring ‘substantial underrepresentation’ in equal protection challenges, 
Castaneda implies that the burden of proof for establishing that the underrepresentation is unfair and 
unreasonable in an equal protection challenge is higher than it is in a fair cross-section challenge.”); 
United States v. Gelb, 881 F.2d 1155, 1161 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[T]he sixth amendment is stricter [than the 
Equal Protection Clause] because it forbids any substantial underrepresentation of minorities, 
regardless of . . . motive.” (quoting Alston v. Manson, 791 F.2d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 
479 U.S. 1084 (1987)) (final alteration in original)); Schulberg, supra note 17, at 17 (“Statistics serve a 
different function in equal protection claims: there, they are circumstantial evidence of discriminatory 
intent.”). The Supreme Court has also not announced a numerical threshold for what is “fair and 
reasonable” in the Sixth Amendment context. In Berghuis v. Smith, the government urged the Court 
to adopt a 10% disparity requirement, 130 S. Ct. 1382, 1394 n.4, but the Court declined to reach the 
issue, and observed only that under the 10% rule, there would be no remedy for a distinct group’s 
complete exclusion if its population in a given community did not reach the 10% threshold. Id. 
 89. See United States v. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d 932, 940 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Unlike the equal 
protection challenge, the fair cross-section claim does not require a showing that the selection 
procedure is susceptible of abuse or not race-neutral; the defendant must only show that the exclusion 
of his or her group is ‘systematic.’”). 
 90. “[M]ost courts have continued to apply the 10% absolute disparity floor set in Swain for equal 
protection cases in order to determine whether a sixth amendment violation has been demonstrated.” 
Cynthia A. Williams, Note, Jury Source Representativeness and the Use of Voter Registration Lists, 
65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 590, 611 (1990). But it is not appropriate to import the 10% threshold to cross-
section cases. See United States v. Green, 389 F. Supp. 2d 29, 55 n.52 (D. Mass 2005) (“[T]he 10% rule 
adopted by some courts is a contrivance, and one based on faulty precedent.”); Waller v. Butkovich, 
593 F. Supp. 942, 954 (M.D.N.C. 1984) (declining to adopt the 10% rule because “[w]hether a fair 
cross section exists is entirely different from whether intentional discrimination occurred”); Schulberg, 
supra note 17, at 17 (“[T]he transposition [of the 10% threshold] is unsound as a matter of doctrine.”); 
Williams, supra, at 611 (“A claimant raising an equal protection challenge should be required to show 
a greater disparity than one alleging a violation of the sixth amendment.”); see also Delgado v. 
Dennehy, 503 F. Supp. 2d 411, 426 n.17 (D. Mass. 2007) (citing Greene, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 55 n.52; 
Waller, 593 F. Supp. at 954). 
 91. See, e.g., Mares v. Scribner, No. 07-56058, 2010 WL 2994032, at *1 (9th Cir. July 29, 2010) 
(denying a fair cross-section claim where the disparity did not constitute “substantial 
underrepresentation” (citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208–09 (1965))); United States v. 
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degree of disparity in light of the system’s race-neutral policies.92 
Although not the subject of this Article, each of these errors undermines 
the fair cross-section right. 
4. Differences in the Relationship Between Disparity and the State 
The third prong of the prima facie case for both the Sixth 
Amendment and the equal protection standards examines the 
relationship between the disparity and the government. This Article 
focuses on this third prong of the test, both because it is here that the two 
constitutional standards diverge the most, and because the majority of 
claims in my survey were denied at least in part based on the defendant’s 
failure to satisfy this prong.93 
In the equal protection context, a judge evaluating a challenge to 
the jury selection system “must keep in mind the fundamental principle 
that ‘official action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it 
results in a racially disproportionate impact.’”94 Instead, “[p]roof of 
racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause.”95 
The Sixth Amendment, however, has no such requirement. The 
Supreme Court made this explicit in Duren. The defendant and the 
United States had cited equal protection cases in their briefs, and the 
 
Booker, No. 05-1929, 2007 WL 2492427, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 5, 2007) (“[Defendant] has not shown, for 
starters, that the representation of either group was not ‘fair and reasonable,’ Duren, 439 U.S. at 364, 
which is to say, that either of these groups was ‘substantially underrepresented’ in the jury wheel, 
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495 n.14.”). 
 92. See, e.g., United States v. Quiroz, No. 03-5120, 2005 WL 1427692, at *2 (5th Cir. June 20, 
2005) (evaluating disparity at the second prong of a cross-section claim in light of the jurisdiction’s 
“use of objective criteria and random selection”). 
 93. In my survey, the majority of claims (104 of 167 cases, or 62%) were denied solely or in part 
on the basis of the defendant’s failure to show that any underrepresentation was due to “systematic 
exclusion.” Infra Appendix. The centrality of Duren’s third prong in my survey is inconsistent with the 
assumption articulated elsewhere that the second prong is the focus of courts’ analysis. See, e.g., 
Hannaford-Agor, supra note 34, at 763 (“Most of the reported cases over the past three decades have 
tended to focus on Duren’s second prong . . . .”). But see Berghuis v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 1382, 1388 
(2010) (“[T]he second and third [prongs] are more likely to generate controversy.”). 
 94. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359–60 (1991) (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metro. 
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–65 (1977)). 
 95. Id. An exception to the intent requirement is made only when the state action is facially 
discriminatory. See, e.g., Monroe v. City of Charlottesville, 579 F.3d 380, 388 (4th Cir. 2009). Notably, 
although both Taylor and Duren involved jury provisions that facially differentiated between men and 
women, the Court did not rely on the facially discriminatory aspects of the jury system when defining 
“systematic exclusion.” Instead, the Court explicitly contrasted the cross-section standard with the 
requirement for evidence of “discriminatory purpose,” Duren, 439 U.S. at 368 n.26, and observed that 
the “systematic” nature of the disparity was “manifestly indicate[d],” id. at 366, by the duration of the 
disparity. Similarly, in Smith, the Court did not premise the denial of the defendant’s claim on the 
absence of any facially exclusive provision. 130 S. Ct. at 1382. 
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Court made a point of correcting them.96 As the Court explained, in the 
cited equal protection cases, the defendants had provided evidence: 
of another essential element of the constitutional violation—
discriminatory purpose. Such evidence is subject to rebuttal evidence 
either that discriminatory purpose was not involved or that such 
purpose did not have a determinative effect. In contrast, in Sixth 
Amendment fair-cross-section cases, systematic disproportion itself 
demonstrates an infringement of the defendant’s interest in a jury 
chosen from a fair community cross section.97 
Because the Sixth Amendment does not require evidence of 
discrimination, a jury system that does not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause can still be in violation of the fair cross-section right.98 This 
distinction may have been most forcefully delineated by Justice 
Rehnquist in his dissents in Taylor and Duren. Rehnquist did not agree 
that there was an independent constitutional basis for the fair cross-
section right established in Taylor, but he recognized that pursuant to the 
majority’s approach: “under equal protection analysis prima facie 
challenges are rebuttable by proof of absence of intent to discriminate, 
while under Sixth Amendment analysis intent is irrelevant.”99 
Instead of demonstrating discrimination, a defendant raising a fair 
cross-section claim has to show that the underrepresentation is “due to 
systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process,” by 
showing that “the cause of the underrepresentation was systematic—that 
 
 96. Duren, 439 U.S. at 368 n.26. 
 97. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 98. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 242 (1978) (“Even though the facts of this case would not 
establish a jury discrimination claim under the Equal Protection Clause, the question of representation 
does constitute one factor of several that, when combined, create a problem of constitutional 
significance under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.”); see also Duren, 439 U.S. at 365 n.24 
(referring to a case that “involved an equal protection challenge to a jury-selection process” and 
noting that “proof of such a claim is in certain respects not analogous to proof of a cross-section 
violation”). 
 99. Duren, 439 U.S. at 371 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Specifically, Rehnquist argued that the 
majority’s new distinction between equal protection cases and fair cross-section cases was a “fiction,” 
and that Duren and Taylor had introduced a “hybrid doctrine” where holdings were characterized as 
Sixth Amendment decisions but actually drew their support from equal protection principles. Id. at 
370–71. Justice Thomas picked up this baton in his concurrence in Smith, quoting Rehnquist for the 
view that the introduction of the cross-section right “rests less on the Sixth Amendment than on an 
‘amalgamation of the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.’” 130 S. Ct. at 1396 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Duren, 439 U.S. at 372 (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting)). Thomas opined that he is “willing to reconsider our precedents articulating the ‘fair 
cross section’ requirement,” because “[h]istorically juries did not include a sampling of persons from 
all levels of society or even from both sexes.” Id. Importantly, although Rehnquist argued that the 
Sixth Amendment doctrine established by the majority was invalid (because it was based on equal 
protection principles), he was clear that the new (objectionable) standard was distinct from the test for 
equal protection violations. Duren, 439 U.S. at 370–71 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). As discussed at Part 
III.C supra, my research did not uncover a single case where the court imported equal protection 
concepts because of the objections Rehnquist articulated. 
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is, inherent in the particular jury-selection process utilized.”100 The most 
straightforward reading of Duren implies that showing a disparity over 
time can alone “manifestly indicate” that the disparity is “inherent” in 
the system and not the product of chance or fluke.101 In Duren, the Court 
held that the defendant’s “undisputed demonstration that a large 
discrepancy occurred not just occasionally, but in every weekly venire for 
a period of nearly a year manifestly indicates that the cause of the 
underrepresentation was systematic.”102 For if a disparity occurs once, it 
could be the product of chance or happenstance, but if it happens “in 
every weekly venire for . . . a year,” the court can be sure that something 
“inherent” is causing it, even if it is not clear exactly what aspect of the 
system is the source.103 
The Duren Court went on to explain that the defendant “also 
established when in the selection process the systematic exclusion [of 
women] took place.”104 He was not able to do so with particularity, but he 
was able to narrow the possibilities down to two stages of the selection 
process.105 And he posited, but did not prove, that the disparity was due 
to the state policy and practice of allowing women to choose to opt out of 
jury service.106 The Court observed that Duren had not established which 
 
 100. Duren, 439 U.S. at 364, 366. 
 101. See, e.g., United States v. Weaver, 267 F.3d 231, 244 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Under Duren, 
‘systematic exclusion’ can be shown by a large discrepancy repeated over time such that the system 
must be said to bring about the underrepresentation . . . .”); United States v. Biaggi, 680 F. Supp. 641, 
653 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (“Duren permits the defendant to focus solely on the composition of the venires 
over time, not on the intent of the registrars, in endeavoring to assemble that proof.”); Williams, supra 
note 90, at 617 (“[D]emand[ing] a showing that the disproportionate representation is inherent in the 
system used, rather than a product of random factors on one particular jury venire . . . is the most 
natural reading of Duren . . . .”). 
 102. Duren, 439 U.S. at 366 (emphasis added). 
 103. See United States v. Green, 389 F. Supp. 2d 29, 56 n.53 (D. Mass. 2005) (“[T]he question is 
whether the underrepresentation [is] ‘inherent in the system used, rather than a product of random 
factors on one particular jury venire.’” (quoting Williams, supra note 90, at 617)); James H. Druff, 
Note, The Cross-Section Requirement and Jury Impartiality, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 1555, 1565 (1985) 
(“[I]ndividual instance of underrepresentation might be a coincidence, whereas a pattern will betray a 
systematic procedural abuse.”). 
 104. Duren, 439 U.S. at 366. 
 105. Id. at 366–67 (demonstrating with “statistics and other evidence” that the disparity occurred 
either when people were summoned for service or when people showed up in court at the “final, 
venire, stage”). 
 106. Id. at 368, 369. The holes in Duren’s “systematic” theory did not go unnoticed: The Missouri 
Supreme Court pointed out that Duren “had not unequivocally demonstrated the extent to which the 
low percentage of women appearing for jury service was due to the automatic exemption for women, 
rather than to sex-neutral exemptions.” Id. at 363. And, as the Court noted, one of the government’s 
primary arguments was that “petitioner has not proved that the exemption for women had ‘any effect’ 
on or was responsible for the underrepresentation of women on venires.” Id. at 368; see People v. 
Morales, 770 P.2d 244, 277 (Cal. 1989) (Broussard, J., dissenting) (“[I]n Duren itself, the court rejected 
the idea that defendant had to show that the underrepresentation was not caused by jurors seeking 
exemptions under provisions which were not subject to attack.”). 
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policy was producing the disparity107 and acknowledged the state 
supreme court’s suggestion that the disparity may have been due to the 
private choices of women to claim exemptions for jury service.108 
Nonetheless, the Court concluded the underrepresentation of women 
“was quite obviously due to the system by which juries were selected. . . . 
Women were therefore systematically underrepresented . . . .”109 
The Supreme Court arguably departed from Duren’s emphasis on 
the duration of the disparity in its only subsequent cross-section opinion, 
Berghuis v. Smith.110 Although the Court adopted the fair cross-section 
standard exactly as it was articulated in Duren,111 the analysis suggests112 
that a more particularized showing of the cause of the disparity is 
required.113 Smith did not, however, add anything new to the distinction 
 
 107. Duren, 439 U.S. at 367 (explaining the disparity was due to either “the automatic exemption 
for women or other statutory exemptions”); id. at 369 (“The other possible cause of the 
disproportionate exclusion of women on Jackson County jury venires is, of course, the automatic 
exemption for women.”). 
 108. Id. at 368. 
 109. Id. at 367. 
 110. 130 S. Ct. 1382 (2010). 
 111. Id. at 1388. 
 112. Smith involved the application of the limited standard of review under the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which restricted the Court’s analysis to the question 
of whether the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision “involved an unreasonable application of[] clearly 
established Federal law.” Id. at 1391 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012)). 
 113. See id. at 1395 (“No ‘clearly established’ precedent of this Court supports Smith’s claim that 
he can make out a prima facie case merely by pointing to a host of factors that, individually or in 
combination, might contribute to a group’s underrepresentation.”). In making this demand for 
specificity, the 2010 Court seemed to be more impressed with Duren’s evidence than the 1979 Court 
had been. According to the Court in Smith, “[t]o show the ‘systematic’ cause of the 
underrepresentation, Duren pointed to Missouri’s law exempting women from jury service, and to the 
manner in which Jackson County administered the exemption,” and Duren “demonstrated systematic 
exclusion with particularity.” Id. at 1388, 1392. Of course, Duren did “point to” Missouri’s law 
exempting women, but the state “pointed to” non-gender based exclusions, and the Court found for 
Duren without resolving the factual question. See People v. Bell, 778 P.2d 129, 171 (Cal. 1989) 
(Broussard, J., dissenting) (“[Th]e Duren court never determined whether the underrepresentation of 
women in Jackson County, Missouri, occurred as a result of facially neutral state exemptions or the 
county’s automatic exemption for women.”). Was it the passage of thirty years that made Duren’s case 
look so much more compelling? Or was it that the Smith opinion was written by Duren’s attorney, and 
her convictions about what she had “established” as an advocate were more powerful than the Court’s 
tempered description of that proof? Duren’s lead attorney was Ruth Bader Ginsburg, then of the 
American Civil Liberties Union, and Justice Ginsburg was the author of Smith. In her brief on behalf 
of Duren, Ginsburg described the state’s argument that the defense had not “established a causal link” 
between the disparity and the gender-based exemption as “an argument of extraordinary fancy,” and 
asserted that the “only genuine explanation for the gross underrepresentation of females” is the state’s 
exemption for women. Reply Brief for Petitioner, Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979) (No. 77-
6067), 1978 WL 207151, at *4, *6. Perhaps an advocate’s assertion about the “only genuine 
explanation” in 1979 was transformed into a Justice’s conclusion about the “altogether obvious 
explanation” in 2010, without accounting for the Court’s recognition of what remained unexplained. In 
any event, the Court in Smith appeared to examine the defendant’s proof of systematic exclusion with 
this rosier version of Duren’s proof in mind, and accordingly faulted the defendant for the imprecision 
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between the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment standards, and the circuit 
opinion that was reversed in Smith had explicitly distinguished the fair 
cross-section analysis from equal protection analysis.114 
5. Differences in Government’s Burden 
In an equal protection case the government must rebut the 
inference of discrimination with evidence that there was no 
discriminatory purpose or, if a discriminatory purpose existed, it did not 
have a “determinative effect.”115  
“In contrast, in Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section cases, 
systematic disproportion itself demonstrates an infringement of the 
defendant’s interest . . . .”116 The government’s rebuttal is therefore 
limited to “[t]he only remaining question”—whether there is “adequate 
justification for this infringement.”117 A justification is adequate if it 
“manifestly and primarily” advances “a significant state interest.”118 
Despite the unique importance of the fair cross-section guarantee 
and the clarity of the Supreme Court’s distinctions between the two 
constitutional tests—as well as the significant amount of case law 
recognizing the stark differences between the two standards119—courts 
 
of his evidence. 
 114. Smith v. Berghuis, 543 F.3d 326, 335–36 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[A] party need not show that the 
underrepresentation of a distinctive group came as a result of intentional discrimination. Duren, 439 
U.S. at 368 n.26. Rather, as other circuits have observed, ‘[u]nlike the equal protection challenge, the 
fair cross section claim does not require a showing that the selection procedure is susceptible [to] 
abuse or not race-neutral; the defendant must only show that the exclusion of his or her group is 
‘systematic.’ United States v. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d 932, 939 (9th Cir. 2005).” (alterations in 
original)). 
 115. Duren, 439 U.S. at 368 n.26 (contrasting the burden in equal protection cases to that in fair 
cross-section cases). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 367. Moreover, “it is the State that bears the burden of justifying this infringement by 
showing attainment of a fair cross section to be incompatible with a significant state interest.” Id. at 
368. The right to a proper jury, however, “cannot be overcome on merely rational grounds.” Id. at 367 
(quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 534 (1975)). 
 119. A number of courts have recognized that a fair cross-section claim does not require an 
inference of discrimination, see, e.g., United States v. Reyes, No. 06-41457, 2007 WL 3208785, at *662 
(5th Cir. Oct. 29, 2007); Randolph v. People, 380 F.3d 1133, 1141 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. 
Weaver, 267 F.3d 231, 244 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Royal, 174 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1999); United 
States v. Jackman, 46 F.3d 1240, 1245 (2d Cir. 1995); Bowen v. Kemp, 769 F.2d 672, 683, 684 n.7 (11th 
Cir. 1985); Parker v. Phillips, 717 F. Supp. 2d 310, 328 (W.D.N.Y 2010); French v. Wolfenbarger, No. 
07-11075, 2010 WL 335304, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 29, 2010); United States v. Manbeck, 514 F. Supp. 
141, 147 (D.C.S.C. 1981); United States v. Jenison, 485 F. Supp. 655, 660 (S.D. Fla. 1979); United 
States v. Armsbury, 408 F. Supp. 1130, 1140 (D. Or. 1976); Washington v. People, 186 P.3d 594, 600 n.4 
(Colo. 2008); State v. Gibbs, 758 A.2d 327, 335 (Conn. 2000); Ramirez v. State, 575 S.E.2d 462, 466–67 
(Ga. 2003); Commonwealth v. Bastarache, 414 N.E.2d 984, 992 (Mass. 1980); State v. Fulton, 566 
N.E.2d 1195, 1200 (Ohio 1991); State v. Cienfuegos, 25 P.3d 1011, 1017 (Wash. 2001), or consideration 
of whether selection policies are race-neutral or susceptible to abuse, see, e.g., Rodriguez-Lara, 421 
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are erroneously applying the equal protection standard to fair cross-
section claims with surprising frequency. 
II.  Equal Protection Standards Are Contaminating the Fair 
Cross-Section Analysis 
Courts are importing equal protection concepts into the third prong 
of Duren’s fair cross-section test, which focuses on systematic exclusion, 
in two ways. First, in what I refer to as “Category A errors,” courts are 
requiring proof of intentional and discriminatory action to establish 
systematic exclusion. Second, in “Category B errors,” courts are 
evaluating the question of systematic exclusion with a focus on fault and 
the opportunities of jurors to serve. 
A wide range of courts have made Category A errors: At least ten 
federal circuits and nineteen states have erroneously denied defendants’ 
Sixth Amendment claims for failure to satisfy the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s equal protection requirement of discriminatory intent.120 
Other courts have made Category B errors, denying cross-section claims 
using an analysis focused on equal protection and its attention to fault 
and opportunities for jurors to serve.121 Moreover, the results of my 
original survey suggest that these errors are being made with surprising 
frequency, in addition to indisputably occurring across jurisdictional 
lines. 
These conclusions derive from my examination of 167 federal and 
state appellate fair cross-section claims decided between 2000 and 2011.122 
Courts denied defendants’ claims in all 167 of those cases,123 and denied 
 
F.3d at 940; United States v. Bates, No. 05-81027, 2009 WL 3270190, at *9–10 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 
2009); Francis v. Fabian, 669 F. Supp. 2d 970, 983 (D. Minn. 2009); People v. Buford, 182 Cal. Rptr. 
904, 908–09 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982), that systematic exclusion can be demonstrated by disparity over 
time, see, e.g., Weaver, 267 F.3d at 244–45; Alston v. Manson, 791 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1986); United 
States v. Biaggi, 680 F. Supp. 641, 648–49 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), and that the analysis is focused on the result 
of the selection process rather than the intentions of those who designed and operate it, see, e.g., 
Royal, 174 F.3d at 9 n.7; Smith v. Commonwealth, 649 N.E.2d 744, 746 (Mass. 1995). 
 120. See infra Appendix. 
 121. See infra Appendix. 
 122. To produce the survey I examined all opinions decided by state supreme courts or federal 
circuit courts of appeals from January 1, 2000 to July 30, 2011 that cited the case of Duren v. Missouri. 
I also searched for federal circuit court cases post-January 1, 2000, using the terms (fair /s (cross /2 
section)) % Duren. After omitting cases that did not address the merits of a Sixth Amendment fair 
cross-section claim, 167 cases remained. The limitations of this approach, and the details of my 
methodology, are discussed in full in the Appendix. The survey’s most significant limitations are the 
temporal limitation to 2000–2011; the exclusion of state fair cross-section cases that do not cite Duren, 
cases that neither cite Duren nor refer to a fair cross-section, and cases not available on Westlaw; and 
the exercise of subjective judgment in omitting cases that did not involve the merits of a Sixth 
Amendment fair cross-section claim. Of course, by limiting the survey to appellate cases, I have also 
necessarily excluded cross-section decisions in trial courts that were not appealed. 
 123. Defendants prevailed on their jury claims in two cases that were omitted from the survey 
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104 of the 167 cases (62%) at least in part on the basis of the defendant’s 
failure to satisfy Duren’s third prong—the failure to show that any 
underrepresentation was due to “systematic exclusion.” Examination of 
this group of 104 “systematic exclusion” denials revealed that 43 cases 
(41%) involved a Category A error and that the courts made a Category 
B error in 24 cases (23%). Because courts made both types of errors in 
13 of the cases, the total number of survey cases involving one of the two 
categories of equal protection error was 54 of 104. As explained above, 
the limitations of the survey significantly restrict the conclusions one can 
draw from the data.124 But in conjunction with the cases discussed in this 
Article, they at least suggest that this doctrinal contamination is 
occurring in more cases than might be expected. 
A. Category A Errors: Requiring Proof of Intentional or 
Discriminatory Action to Establish Systematic Exclusion 
The third prong of the Duren test, as explained above, asks whether 
the disparity between the representation of the distinctive group in the 
population and in the jury system is “systematic,” or “inherent” in the 
selection process.125 It specifically does not impose the equal protection 
requirement of “[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose.”126 
Yet courts evaluating fair cross-section claims frequently deny the claim 
because the defendant has failed to prove purposeful exclusion or 
discrimination. 
1. Requiring Proof of Intentional or Discriminatory Action in Jury 
Selection 
On the spectrum of judicial errors, mixing up constitutional 
amendments and imposing requirements that do not exist is a relatively 
dramatic mistake. Yet courts frequently conclude, for example, that 
because the defendant “has failed to demonstrate systematic 
discrimination, we reject his Sixth Amendment claim.”127 Indeed, the 
mistake of denying Sixth Amendment claims for the failure to satisfy the 
Fourteenth Amendment requirement of intentional and discriminatory 
exclusion has been made by the First,128 Third,129 Fourth,130 Fifth,131 
 
because they were decided pursuant to state statutes. See Azania v. State, 778 N.E.2d 1253, 1259 (Ind. 
2002); State v. LaMere, 2 P.3d 204, 219, 220 (Mont. 2000). 
 124. See infra Appendix. 
 125. Duren, 439 U.S. at 366. 
 126. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359–60 (1991). 
 127. State v. Jones, 744 N.E.2d 1163, 1173 (Ohio 2001) (emphasis added). 
 128. See, e.g., Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 997 (1st Cir. 1985) (en banc) (“[Allowing] a fair 
degree of leeway in designating jurors so long as the state or community does not actively prevent 
people from serving or actively discriminate, and so long as the system is reasonably open to all.” 
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Sixth,132 Seventh,133 Eighth,134 Ninth,135 and Eleventh136 Circuits, by federal 
district courts,137 and by state courts in Alabama,138 Arkansas,139 
 
(emphasis added)). 
 129. Hayer v. Univ. of Med., 2012 WL 3090912, at *2 (3d Cir. June 8, 2012) 
(“Plaintiff’s . . . argument . . . is that the jury selection process violated her right to equal protection 
because the jury did not represent a fair cross-section of the community. . . . To prevail on this claim, 
plaintiff must show that the underrepresentation resulted from ‘purposeful discrimination’ by 
demonstrating [the three Duren factors].” (quoting Duren, 439 U.S. at 364) (emphasis added)). 
 130. See, e.g., United States v. McGrady, Nos. 96-4269, 96-4270, 96-4271, 1999 WL 95633, at *2–3 
(4th Cir. Feb. 17, 1999) (“[The disparity does not] demonstrate that the exclusion of minorities was 
due to the sort of discriminatory ‘system’ outlawed in Taylor and Duren.” (emphasis added)); United 
States v. Cecil, 836 F.2d 1431, 1445 (4th Cir. 1988) (“[I]t is sufficient that the selection be in terms of a 
‘fair cross-section’ gathered without active discrimination.” (emphasis added) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 131. See, e.g., Rivas v. Thaler, No. 10-70007, 2011 WL 2748394, *403 (5th Cir. July 14, 2011) (“[The 
defendant’s evidence] does not constitute the type of affirmative barrier to selection for jury service 
that is the hallmark of a Sixth Amendment violation.” (emphasis added)); United States v. Steen, 
55 F.3d 1022, 1030 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he exclusion of a particular minority group from jury service 
[must be] due to some form of intentional discrimination.” (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. 
Lopez, 588 F.2d 450, 451–52 (5th Cir. 1979))); Atwell v. Blackburn, 800 F.2d 502, 505 (5th Cir. 1986) 
(“[The petitioner in a fair cross-section claim] bears the burden of proving, at the least, that a 
constitutionally distinctive group or identifiable segment of the community was purposefully excluded 
from his grand jury venire by the jury selection process.” (emphasis added)); see also Murphy v. 
Johnson, 205 F.3d 809, 818 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he Supreme Court had consistently held that racial 
discrimination in the selection of grand juries was violative of the fair cross-section requirement.” 
(citing two equal protection cases)). 
 132. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, No. 05-1929, 2007 WL 2492427, at *5 (6th Cir. Sept. 5, 2007) 
(“Nor has [the defendant] shown that the system of jury selection in the district facially targets one of 
the underrepresented groups . . . .” (emphasis added)); Polk v. Hunt, No. 95-5323, 1996 WL 47110, at 
*2 (6th Cir. Feb. 5, 1996) (“A panel of prospective jurors represents a fair cross-section of the 
community if it is gathered without active discrimination.”); see also United States v. Johnson, No. 00-
2443, 2002 WL 1402157, at *96 (6th Cir. June 27, 2002); United States v. Davis, No. 00-3974, 2001 WL 
1662485, at *597–98 (6th Cir. Dec. 27, 2001); Ford v. Seabold, 841 F.2d 677, 685 (6th Cir. 1988). 
 133. See, e.g., United States v. Phillips, 239 F.3d 829, 842 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[The defendants] 
challenged the jury composition under the Sixth Amendment, which forbids racial discrimination in 
the selection of jurors.” (emphasis added)); Johnson v. McCaughtry, 92 F.3d 585, 594 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(finding no systemic exclusion because the defendant “[did] not allege any other discriminatory actions 
on the part of the state that could account for the total disparity” (emphasis added)); United States v. 
Gometz, 730 F.2d 475, 478 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (“The Sixth Amendment has been interpreted to 
forbid racial discrimination in the selection of jurors . . . [but the claim is denied because] [s]ystematic 
discrimination . . . has not been shown.”). 
 134. See, e.g., United States v. Tripp, No. 08-2065, 2010 WL 1267153, at *759 (8th Cir. May 13, 
2010) (“The Constitution . . . merely prohibits deliberate exclusion of an identifiable racial group from 
the juror selection process.” (emphasis added)); see also United States v. Horne, 4 F.3d 579, 588 (8th 
Cir. 1993) (discussed in text, infra note 160). 
 135. See, e.g., United States v. Hara, No. 06-10192, 2007 WL 1814078, at *265 (9th Cir. June 21, 
2007) (holding, where defendant raised both a fair cross-section claim and an equal protection claim, 
that “[t]o prevail on either claim, Appellant must show a prima facie case for discrimination”). 
 136. See, e.g., United States v. Carver, No. 10-11599, 2011 WL 1304757, at * 807 (11th Cir. Apr. 6, 
2011) (“Moreover, Carver presents no evidence that the five-county area from which the jury venire 
was chosen was gerrymandered to exclude African Americans.” (emphasis added)); United States v. 
Hester, No. 05-12285, 2006 WL 3248012, at *715 (11th Cir. Sept. 18, 2006) (“[Defendants] failed to 
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California,140 Georgia,141 Illinois,142 Indiana,143 Kansas,144 Michigan,145 
Mississippi,146 Nebraska,147 Nevada,148 New York,149 North Carolina,150 
 
present evidence that African-Americans are systematically underrepresented in the jury pool. 
Moreover, [the defendants] acknowledged in the district court that they could not show bad will in the 
process as a whole . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 137. See, e.g., Stukes v. Lawler, No. 4-10-CV-24, 2011 WL 1988375, at *15 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2011) 
(“[For a Sixth Amendment violation,] [p]roof is required of an actual discriminatory practice in the 
jury selection process, not merely underrepresentation of one particular group. The defendant bears 
the initial burden of presenting prima facie evidence of discrimination in the jury selection process.” 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted)); Scott v. Sobrina, No. 09-1081, 2010 WL 8128749, at *18 (E.D. 
Pa. Jan. 29, 2010) (explaining that under the Sixth Amendment “[u]nder-representation of a particular 
group is insufficient to prove unconstitutional discrimination” (emphasis added)); United States v. 
Kellam, 498 F. Supp. 2d 875, 882 (W.D. Va. 2007) (“[I]t is sufficient that the selection be in terms of a 
fair cross-section gathered without active discrimination.” (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. 
Cecil, 836 F.2d 1431, 1445 (4th Cir. 1988))); Warren v. Sherman, No. 2-05-CV-118, 2007 WL 2683210, 
at *3 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 7, 2007) (“Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment fair cross-section claim . . . would 
still fail because it lacked an essential element—that the exclusion of African-Americans and other 
minorities must be intentional.” (emphasis added)); Cross v. Johnson, 169 F. Supp. 2d 603, 620 (N.D. 
Tex. 2001) (“An assertedly discriminatory selection of a jury venire may be challenged under the Sixth 
Amendment when the venire fails to reflect a fair cross-section of the community. There is no 
evidence to even suggest that the venire was selected pursuant to a practice that provided an 
opportunity for discrimination.” (emphasis added)). 
 138. See, e.g., Calhoun v. State, 932 So. 2d 923, 939 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005) (“Calhoun had the 
burden of establishing a prima facie showing of racial discrimination.” (emphasis added)); Ford v. 
State, 628 So. 2d 1068, 1069 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (citing requirement to establish “primary 
inference of invidious discrimination” (emphasis added)). 
 139. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 257 S.W.3d 92, 99 (Ark. 2007) (“We have held that when the jury 
venire is drawn by random selection, the mere showing that it is not representative of the racial 
composition of the population will not make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination.” (emphasis 
added)); Ellis v. State, No. CR 05-643, 2006 WL 2708400, at *4 (Ark. Sept. 21, 2006) (“[A]ppellant has 
not met his burden of establishing a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination [under the Sixth 
Amendment].” (emphasis added)); see also Navarro v. State, 264 S.W.3d 530, 540–41 (Ark. 2007); 
State v. Fudge, 206 S.W.3d 850, 862 (Ark. 2005). 
 140. See, e.g., People v. Ayala, 1 P.3d 3, 21 (Cal. 2000) (“The [jurisdiction’s method of jury 
selection] does not discriminate on the basis of ethnicity or national origin. Hence, defendant has not 
shown that the jury selection process contained an ‘improper feature.’” (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted)). 
 141. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 571 S.E.2d 740, 748 (Ga. 2002) (“[No systematic exclusion existed 
where] [t]here was no showing of any effort to impede Hispanic voter registration in Hall County . . . . 
[and] also no evidence that the jury commission acted in a discriminatory manner by limiting or 
excluding Hispanic participation in the Hall County jury pool.” (emphasis added)). 
 142. See, e.g., People v. Bradley, 810 N.E.2d 494, 496 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (“[W]e find that an 
underrepresentation of African-American people on one jury panel does not allow for the conclusion 
that evidence of systematic and purposeful exclusion must exist.” (emphasis added)); People v. 
Saunders, 543 N.E.2d 1078, 1085 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (“[T]he trial court properly determined that 
defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination in the jury selection process.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 143. See, e.g., James v. State, 613 N.E.2d 15, 29 (Ind. 1993) (“The issue of the racial composition of 
the jury, when raised by a defendant, requires a demonstration of purposeful discrimination against 
that racial group. The defendant bears the burden of showing that the discrimination was due to a 
systematic exclusion of that particular group. Absent such purposeful discrimination and systematic 
exclusion, defendants’ claims relating to the racial composition of jury panels have not been 
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Ohio,151 Pennsylvania,152 Rhode Island,153 Tennessee,154 Washington,155 and 
Wisconsin.156 Nine additional states signed onto an amicus brief in 
 
recognized.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); see also Highler v. State, 834 N.E.2d 182, 188 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2005), aff’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 854 N.E.2d 823 (Ind. 2006). 
 144. See, e.g., State v. Lewis, 161 P.3d 807, 811–12 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007) (“[There is no Sixth 
Amendment claim because,] [a]ccording to Swain, this disparity [demonstrated by defendant] does not 
establish purposeful discrimination.” (emphasis added)). 
 145. See, e.g., People v. Ward, No. 265839, 2007 WL 3226309, at *6 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2007) 
(“To succeed on a claim of racial discrimination in the composition of the jury venire or pool that 
violates the Sixth Amendment, defendant must first show a prima facie case of racial 
discrimination. . . . [D]efendant has not shown a prima facie case of racial discrimination, and his Sixth 
Amendment claim fails.” (emphasis added)). 
 146. See, e.g., Yarbrough v. State, 911 So. 2d 951, 956 (Miss. 2005) (“Yarbrough has offered no 
evidence, either in his motion at trial or on appeal, which alleges the type of systematic exclusion of a 
distinctive group found in either Duren or Gathings. In fact, during the hearing on Yarbrough’s 
motion, the prosecution noted that Yarbrough had offered no evidence which suggested racial 
discrimination in the drawing or selection of jurors. We agree.” (emphasis added)). 
 147. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 637 N.W.2d 632, 652 (Neb. 2002) (“A defendant cannot, under 
either a Sixth Amendment or an equal protection challenge, simply allege that no minorities are on 
the jury, but has the burden of establishing systematic exclusion and purposeful discrimination.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 148. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 125 P.3d 627, 632 (Nev. 2005) (“The third prong of the Sixth 
Amendment’s guarantee requires systematic discrimination.” (emphasis added)). 
 149. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 522 N.Y.S.2d 1017, 1020 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987) (“As to the fair cross-
section claim, defendant is only entitled to a hearing if his motion sufficiently specifies some facts 
establishing systematic discrimination in the jury selection process.” (emphasis added)); People v. 
Henderson, 490 N.Y.S.2d 94, 97 (N.Y. City Ct. 1985) (denying claim where “although the 
discriminatory effect may be the same, it is significant that Blacks and Hispanics are not targeted as 
such for exclusion from the jury panel. . . . Blacks and Hispanics are not excluded from the jury pool by 
reason of any discriminatory purpose.” (emphasis added)). 
 150. See, e.g., State v. Golphin, 533 S.E.2d 168, 192 (N.C. 2000) (described in text, infra note 158); 
see also State v. Williams, 565 S.E.2d 609, 638 (N.C. 2002). 
 151. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 744 N.E.2d 1163, 1173 (Ohio 2001) (described in text, supra note 127); 
State v. Dunn, No. 16904, 2000 WL 1433873, at *10 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2000) (“Ohio courts have 
defined ‘systematic’ as ‘the intentional exclusion of a distinctive group.’” (emphasis added)); see also 
State v. Jackson, 836 N.E.2d 1173, 1193 (Ohio 2005). 
 152. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson, 838 A.2d 663, 682 (Pa. 2003) (“To establish a prima facie 
violation of the requirement that a jury array fairly represent the community . . . . [p]roof is required of 
an actual discriminatory practice in the jury selection process, not merely under-representation of one 
particular group. The defendant bears the initial burden of presenting prima facie evidence of 
discrimination in the jury selection process.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); Commonwealth v. 
Craver, 688 A.2d 691, 696 (Pa. 1997) (“The United States Supreme Court likewise requires a showing 
of actual discriminatory practice to prevail on this issue.” (emphasis added)); Commonwealth v. Estes, 
851 A.2d 933, 936 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 2004) (“The mere showing of underrepresentation, absent an actual 
discriminatory practice in the jury selection process, causes Appellant’s constitutional claim to fail.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 153. See, e.g., State v. Lawless, 996 A.2d 166, 169 (R.I. 2010) (supporting decision with cases 
finding that defendants “failed to meet their burden of proof to show that the state engaged in any 
discriminatory practices” and that defendant had “clearly not met his burden of proof” because he 
made “neither an allegation nor a showing that the jury-selection process . . . has resulted in the 
systematic and deliberate exclusion of members of a particular race” (alteration in original) (emphasis 
added) (quoting State v. Perry, 725 A.2d 264, 268 (R.I. 1999); State v. Gaines, 528 A.2d 305, 308–09 
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Berghuis v. Smith, asserting that in order to prove the systematic 
exclusion of African-Americans, a defendant has “to prove that African 
Americans were treated differently,” specifically, that “the juror 
selection procedure is administered in [a] discriminatory manner,” by 
providing “evidence of actual discriminatory or exclusionary practices.”157 
The judicial decisions are striking for their imprecise treatment of 
the two constitutional standards. Consider the conclusion of the North 
Carolina Supreme Court in 2000: “As to the third prong of Duren, this 
Court has held ‘[t]he fact that a particular jury or series of juries does not 
statistically reflect the racial composition of the community does not in 
itself make out an invidious discrimination forbidden by the [Equal 
Protection] Clause.’”158 
This kind of baffling confusion is not limited to state courts. For 
example, in 2004 the Seventh Circuit analyzed a challenge to “the jury 
composition under the Sixth Amendment, which forbids racial 
discrimination in the selection of jurors.”159 The Eighth Circuit likewise 
 
(R.I. 1987))); State v. Sosa, 839 A.2d 519, 528 (R.I. 2003) (“The Sixth Amendment is designed to 
prevent the state from utilizing a system that deliberately excludes groups of potential jurors from the 
entire jury pool.” (emphasis added)). 
 154. See, e.g., State v. Taylor, No. 02C01-9501-CR-00029, 1996 WL 580997, at *18–19 (Tenn. Crim. 
App. Oct. 10, 1996) (“In order to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, the 
defendant must show that: [citing Duren factors].” (emphasis added) (citing Duren v. Missouri, 
439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979))). 
 155. See, e.g., State v. Palomares, No. 24658-2-III, 2007 WL 1649904, at *3–4 (Wash. Ct. App. June 
7, 2007). (“Under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, 
section 22 of the Washington Constitution . . . . [t]he defendant bears the burden of proving that 
discrimination in the selection of the jury pool occurred.” (emphasis added)). 
 156. See, e.g., State v. Blanks, No. 95-2944-CR-NM, 1996 WL 346263, at *3 (Wis. Ct. App. June 26, 
1996) (“The trial court found that the absence of any African-Americans in the venire was ‘just the 
luck of the draw.’ The trial court’s comments belie any contention of systematic exclusion of African-
Americans as jurors. . . . [T]here was nothing to suggest that the venire pool was designed in any way to 
avoid having a fair cross section of the community represented.” (emphasis added)). 
 157. Brief of the States of Connecticut, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Maryland, New Mexico, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah and Wisconsin as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 32–33, Berghuis v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 1382 (2010) (No. 08-1402), 2009 
WL 4247967, at *32–33 (quoting United States v. Ireland, 62 F.3d 227, 231 (8th Cir. 1995); United 
States v. Cecil, 836 F.2d 1431, 1446 (4th Cir. 1988)). The Court’s opinion makes no mention of the 
states’ argument, which was echoed in the amicus brief of the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, an 
organization concerned in part with “rapid, efficient, and reliable determination of guilt and swift 
execution of punishment.” Brief Amicus Curiae of the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation in Support 
of Petitioner at 1, Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. 1382 (No. 08-1402), 2009 WL 4307581, at *1. These states were 
not included in the list of nineteen states that have made Category A errors, because the amicus brief 
does not constitute a judicial decision. It does, of course, reflect the erroneous interpretation of the 
law by the states’ attorney generals’ offices. 
 158. State v. Golphin, 533 S.E.2d 168, 192 (N.C. 2000) (alterations in original) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976); State v. Avery, 261 S.E.2d 803, 806 (N.C. 
1980)); see State v. Williams, 565 S.E.2d 609, 638 (N.C. 2002) (quoting same language). 
 159. United States v. Phillips, 239 F.3d 829, 842 (7th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added). 
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denied a claim where the defendant had not satisfied the “third Taylor-
Duren requirement, a showing that the particular jury pool plan utilized 
is being administered in a deliberately discriminatory manner.”160 And the 
Sixth Circuit issued the following convoluted holding: 
The United States Supreme Court has explicitly held that, in order to 
establish that a jury is not picked from a fair cross-section of the 
community, a defendant must show [the three Duren factors. The 
defendant’s] failure to meet these evidentiary burdens dooms his claim 
of a denial of equal protection guarantees.161 
To add insult to constitutional injury, some courts reprimand the 
defendant who suggests he is not required to prove discriminatory intent. 
According to one district court addressing a cross-section claim, “even if 
Petitioner was correct that African-Americans were excluded from the 
jury pool . . . his claim would still fail because it lacked an essential 
element—that the exclusion of African-Americans and other minorities 
must be intentional.”162 The court acknowledged that the defendant-
petitioner “contends” that the state appellate court “applied the wrong 
law to the facts of his claim” by applying an equal protection case.163 But 
the court was not impressed and cited the same equal protection case for 
the point that the “United States Supreme Court has ruled that a 
showing of purposeful discrimination is [an] essential element of a claim 
of racial discrimination in the jury process.”164 Similarly, an Alabama 
court took to task the defendant who “misapprehends the nature of the 
fair cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment,” and faulted him 
for failing to “establish a primary inference of invidious 
discrimination.”165 
This type of Category A error (explicitly requiring evidence of 
discrimination in jury selection)166 has garnered sharp criticisms from the 
few judges who have recognized that their colleagues were applying a 
tainted test. Judges in the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, as 
well as district court judges in the Second Circuit and a judge on the 
 
 160. United States v. Horne, 4 F.3d 579, 588 (8th Cir. 1993) (emphasis added). 
 161. United States v. Davis, 27 F. App’x 592, 597–98 (6th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added) (citing 
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979)). 
 162. Warren v. Sherman, No. 2:05-cv-118, 2007 WL 2683210, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 7, 2007) 
(emphasis added) (“The Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge (Docket # 21) is 
approved and adopted as the opinion of the Court.”).  
 163. Id. The defendant argued that the court’s reliance on Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 
(2003), “was erroneous because that case dealt with [jury selection polices that were] allegedly 
discriminatory.” Warren, 2007 WL 2683210, at *3. Indeed, the question in Miller-El was whether “the 
jury selection procedures violated the Equal Protection Clause.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 326. 
 164. Warren, 2007 WL 2683210, at *3 (citing Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 322). 
 165. Ford v. State, 628 So. 2d 1068, 1069 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (emphasis added). 
 166. In the survey, 28 of the 104 “systematic exclusion claims” involved this type of Category A 
error. 
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California Supreme Court, have criticized their colleagues’ erroneous 
importation of equal protection concepts,167 accusing them of “break[ing] 
rank with established Supreme Court precedent”168 and “mistakenly 
import[ing] an equal protection concept into a fair cross-section 
challenge.”169 But each of those jurisdictions has continued to apply 
elements of the equal protection standard.170 
In another manifestation of the focus on intentional discrimination, 
courts have denied systematic exclusion claims where the defendant has 
failed to demonstrate that the jury selection process is based on race.171 
These courts assert that “underrepresentation of minority groups 
resulting from race-neutral . . . practices does not amount to ‘systematic 
exclusion’ necessary to support a representative cross-section claim.”172 
Yet the race-neutral nature of jury selection policies is irrelevant to a 
Sixth Amendment claim.173 The emphasis in both federal174 and state175 
 
 167. Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 1004 (5th Cir. 1985) (Bownes, J., dissenting, joined by Coffin, 
J.) (“Their finding that evidence of intentional discrimination is required is directly counter to the law 
the Court stated in [Duren] . . . .”); see United States v. Footracer, 189 F.3d 1058, 1069 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(Pregerson, J., dissenting) (“[R]equiring a defendant to show disparate treatment requires him to show 
discriminatory intent, which is not an element of a Sixth Amendment fair cross-section challenge.” 
(footnote omitted)); United States v. Rogers, 73 F.3d 774, 776 (8th Cir. 1996) (“In [a prior case], our 
court introduced an element of intentional discrimination not required by the Supreme Court.”); 
United States v. Cecil, 836 F.2d 1431, 1464 (4th Cir. 1988) (Phillips. J., dissenting in relevant part, 
joined by Winter & Murnaghan, JJ.) (“Duren thus undermines the critical assumption made by this 
court that the fair-cross-section requirement only protects against intentional discrimination in the jury 
selection process . . . .”); Anaya v. Hansen, 781 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1986) (Bownes, J., concurring); 
Parker v. Phillips, 717 F. Supp. 2d 310, 336 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) (Bianchini, J.) (“[T]he Appellate Division 
conflated the elements of a Due Process/Equal Protection jury pool claim with those of a Sixth 
Amendment fair cross-section claim . . . .”); United States v. Biaggi, 680 F. Supp. 641, 653 (S.D.N.Y. 
1988) (Motley, J.) (criticizing a Second Circuit decision that incorporated a discrimination requirement 
as “flatly contradictory of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Duren”); People v. Bell, 778 P.2d 129, 170 
(Cal. 1989) (en banc) (Broussard, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s erroneous definition of ‘systematic 
exclusion’ betrays their inability or unwillingness to comprehend the difference between an equal 
protection analysis and a representative cross-section analysis.”); see also People v. Morales, 48 Cal. 3d 
527, 579–80 (1989) (Broussard, J., dissenting). 
 168. Barber, 772 F.2d at 1004 (Bownes, J., dissenting, joined by Coffin, J.). 
 169. Footracer, 189 F.3d at 1069 (Pregerson, J., dissenting). 
 170. See supra Part II.A. 
 171. In the survey, 12 of the 104 “systematic exclusion claims” involved this type of Category A 
error. 
 172. People v. Currie, 87 Cal. App. 4th 225, 236 (2001) (alteration in original). 
 173. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 174. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 247 F. App’x 321, 323 n.2 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[J]ury selection 
procedures using voter registration and motor vehicle records [are] procedures constituted using 
facially neutral criteria [that] allow no opportunity for subjective or racially motivated judgments.”); 
United States v. Pritt, No. 6:09-cr-110-Orl-28KRS, 2010 WL 2342440, at *6 (M.D. Fla. June 8, 2010) 
(“[T]here are no allegations that the process is not executed in a neutral and random manner. [The 
defendant] only objects that the neutral process results in the underrepresentation of Blacks and 
Hispanics. This does not amount to systematic exclusion under the Sixth Amendment.”); see also 
United States v. Anthony, 138 F. App’x 591, 593 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Clark, 112 F. App’x 
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cases on the race-neutral nature of the selection policies imports the 
explicit equal protection concern with race-neutrality,176 and it reflects an 
erroneous focus on the intent of the administrators who create and 
enforce the policies—instead of the results of those policies. In a 2008 
Second Circuit case, for example, the court recognized that “the district 
court failed in its attempt to achieve [a racial] balance” but held that 
“does not detract from the court’s demonstrably race-neutral approach to 
juror selection.”177 In some cases the court assures the defendant that 
because the jury administrators are not aware of the race of the people in 
the jury pool, the administrators cannot possibly be systematically 
excluding them.178 
In the same vein, courts sometimes emphasize that jurors are 
“randomly” selected by a computer and assert that this process 
“guarantees that there can be no purposeful exclusion of African 
Americans.”179 In other words, because a computer cannot discriminate, a 
computer-generated list cannot result in systematic exclusion. Similarly, 
 
481, 485–86 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds, 545 U.S. 1101 (2005). 
 175. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 637 N.W.2d 632, 652 (Neb. 2002) (“[P]ermissible racially neutral 
selection criteria and procedures were used which produced the monochromatic result . . . . [T]he 
venire panel . . . was selected on a random basis without reference to race or the race of the defendant 
being tried.”); People v. Alvarez Hernandez, No. 1352/00, 2002 WL 31109621, at *10 (N.Y. Cnty. Ct. 
Feb. 13, 2002) (finding no systematic exclusion where the jury selection process “involves 
indiscriminate and arbitrary selection from several nondiscriminatory source lists and, therefore, is 
race-neutral and does not discriminate against any distinctive and cognizable group”); see also People 
v. Anderson, 22 P.3d 347, 364 (Cal. 2001); State v. Casillas, 205 P.3d 830, 838 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009); 
State v. Blakeney, 531 S.E.2d 799, 809 (N.C. 2000); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 815 A.2d 563, 575 (Pa. 
2002). 
 176. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d 932, 940 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Unlike the 
equal protection challenge, the fair cross-section claim does not require a showing that the selection 
procedure is susceptible of abuse or not race-neutral; the defendant must only show that the exclusion 
of his or her group is ‘systematic.’”). 
 177. United States v. Bullock, 550 F.3d 247, 252 (2d Cir. 2008) (emphasis added). 
 178. See, e.g., State v. Holland, 976 A.2d 227, 239 (Me. 2009) (“[T]he questionnaires sent to 
prospective jurors seek no information concerning their race, making it impossible for individuals of 
any particular race to be systematically excluded from the jury pool.”); see also Clark, 112 F. App’x at 
484; Thomas v. State, 257 S.W.3d 92, 99 (Ark. 2007); State v. Jackson, 836 N.E.2d 1173, 1193 (Ohio 
2005). It is of questionable comfort, of course, to be assured that your rights are not being violated 
because no one is keeping track of whether they are violating your rights. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 
125 P.3d 627, 632 n.18 (Nev. 2005) (“[W]ithout knowledge of the composition of the jury pool and jury 
lists, an assertion that they provide juries comprising a fair cross section of the community is mere 
speculation.”). 
 179. Price v. State, 66 S.W.3d 653, 665 (Ark. 2002); see, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 79 F. App’x 
656, 661 (5th Cir. 2003) (“Because the district court determined that the selection process was random 
and computer-generated, there could be no ‘systematic exclusion’ of African-Americans.”); 
Commonwealth v. Romero, 938 A.2d 362, 374 (Pa. 2007) (“[A] computer randomly selects names 
from the list. There is no way for the system to include or exclude venire persons based on race or 
gender.” (citation omitted)); see also State v. Fudge, 206 S.W.3d 850, 862 (Ark. 2005); Le v. State, 
913 So. 2d 913, 925 (Miss. 2005); Pritt, 2010 WL 2342440, at *6. In the survey, 6 of the 104 “systematic 
exclusion claims” involved this type of Category A error. 
Chernoff_19 (S. ALESSI) (Do Not Delete) 12/19/2012 3:05 PM 
December 2012]        UNDERMINE FAIR CROSS-SECTION GUARANTEE 175 
 
courts emphasize that the selection system was designed to avoid 
systematic exclusion,180 or that there is evidence that jury administrators 
have affirmatively tried to include African-Americans and Hispanics.181 
The focus on both the way the system was intended to operate and the 
benign intentions of jury officials—like the emphasis on race-neutral 
policies and random selection—reflects the problematic attention given 
to the intent behind the selection system and not the results. 
2. Requiring Proof of Intentional or Discriminatory Action in Voter 
Registration 
The demand for evidence of discrimination is also frequently 
manifested in cases where the court concludes or assumes that 
(a) African-Americans and/or Hispanics are underrepresented in the jury 
pool; (b) the underrepresentation is caused by the jury office’s use of 
voter registration lists as the source of juror names; because (c) African-
Americans and/or Hispanics are underrepresented on voter lists in that 
jurisdiction. In these “voter registration claim” cases, courts often deny 
the defendant’s fair cross-section claim based on the absence of proof 
that people are discriminated against in registering to vote.182 
For example, in a 2009 opinion the Second Circuit held that “absent 
positive evidence that some groups have been hindered in attempting to 
register to vote, a jury venire drawn from voter registration lists violates 
neither the Sixth Amendment’s fair cross-section requirement nor the 
Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of Equal Protection.”183 State courts and at 
 
 180. See, e.g., United States v. Tillman, 80 F. App’x 520, 522 (7th Cir. 2003) (“The district court’s 
‘Plan for the Random Selection of Jurors’ does not provide any factual basis for a finding of 
impropriety.”); Holland, 976 A.2d at 238 (“There is no evidence in the record to suggest that, even if 
underrepresentation had been shown, it was due to systematic exclusion of any group in jury selection 
processes. Maine jury selection practices are designed to ensure that no such systemic exclusion could 
occur.”); see also Ellis v. State, No. CR 05-643, 2006 WL 2708400, at *4 (Ark. Sept. 21, 2006); 
Blakeney, 531 S.E.2d at 809. In the survey, 6 of the 104 “systematic exclusion claims” involved this 
type of Category A error. 
 181. See, e.g., Bullock, 550 F.3d at 251–52 (“Bullock loses because he has not established any 
‘systematic exclusion.’ . . . To the contrary, . . . [t]he motor vehicle roll was included specifically ‘to 
make sure that [the] jury pool [wa]s balanced.’”); United States v. Anthony, 138 F. App’x at 591, 593, 
594 (4th Cir. July 12, 2005) (citing “a ‘direct effort’ to include more African-Americans” and “a direct 
attempt to increase the number of African-Americans in the jury venire”); see also United States v. 
Booker, 367 F. App’x 571, 575 (6th Cir. 2007); People v. Burney, 212 P.3d 639, 662–63 (Cal. 2009); 
Smith v. State, 571 S.E.2d 740, 748–49 (Ga. 2002). In the survey, 5 of the 104 “systematic exclusion 
claims” involved this type of Category A error. 
 182. In the survey, 20 of the 104 “systematic exclusion claims” involved a Category B error in a 
claim based on disparity resulting from reliance on underrepresentative voter lists. 
 183. United States v. Carter, No. 07-5756-cr, 2009 WL 765004, at *1 (2d Cir. Mar. 25, 2009) 
(quoting United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 659 (2d Cir. 1997)). The fact that the Second Circuit 
had made this same mistake and then corrected itself in a prior case, only to make it again in Carter, is 
discussed in more detail below. See supra Part III.C. 
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least three other circuits have similarly denied fair cross-section claims 
because the defendant offered no evidence that the unrepresentative 
voter registration lists (and thus the jury lists) were the product of 
discriminatory voter registration policies, or that voter lists were 
compiled in anything but a racially neutral (that is, non-discriminatory) 
manner.184 In another variation on this theme, courts recite that they have 
previously approved of the use of voter registration lists as source lists—
notwithstanding any resulting underrepresentation—and then cite equal 
protection cases that approved of such lists in the context of 
discrimination claims.185 
Proof that a stage of the jury selection system does not discriminate 
is not relevant to a legal standard that does not require evidence of 
discrimination. As the Tenth Circuit explained: “It is not a sufficient 
defense, of course, merely to argue . . . that voter registration lists can 
never be exclusionary so long as eligible voters of all races are equally 
allowed to register. That might be a defense to an equal protection 
challenge to the right to vote,” but it is not relevant to “the issue of 
whether jurors are selected in a way that results in the systematic 
exclusion of a cognizable group.”186 The conclusion that a system that 
 
 184. United States v. Greatwalker, 356 F.3d 908, 911 (8th Cir. 2004) (“[Defendant] has not 
attempted to prove Native Americans, in particular, face obstacles to registering to vote in presidential 
elections . . . . [and thus] has failed to show Native Americans are systematically excluded from jury 
pools . . . .”); United States v. Cecil, 836 F.2d 1431, 1448 (4th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he use of voter 
registration lists . . . will not be invalidated because a group chooses not to avail itself of the right to 
register without any discrimination of any kind . . . .”); United States v. Joost, No. 95-2031, 1996 WL 
480215, at *8 (1st Cir. Aug. 7, 1996) (“As for Duren’s third prong . . . [w]hat would have to be 
demonstrated would be either the use of suspect voter-registration qualifications or discriminatory 
administration of the jury-selection procedure.”); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 815 A.2d 563, 575 (Pa. 
2002) (“[A] criminal defendant may not attack the racial composition of jury panels drawn from voter 
registration lists on the theory that blacks are underrepresented in voter lists because such computer 
generated lists are compiled without regard to race.”); see also Smith, 571 S.E.2d at 748–49; State v. 
Tremblay, No. P1 97-1816AB, 2003 WL 23018762, at *7 (Sup. Ct. R.I. Mar. 19, 2003). In the survey, 6 
of the 104 “systematic exclusion claims” involved a Category A error based on a finding that non-
discriminatory voter registration lists could not give rise to a cross-section claim. 
 185. See, e.g., Soria v. Johnson, 207 F.3d 232, 249 (5th Cir. 2000) (“This Court has held that ‘[t]he 
fact that an identifiable minority group votes in a proportion lower than the rest of the population and 
is therefore underrepresented on jury panels presents no constitutional issue.’” (quoting United States 
v. Brummitt, 665 F.2d 521, 527 (5th Cir. 1981))); United States v. Brummitt, 665 F.2d 521, 527 (5th Cir. 
1981) (“A prima facie case of discrimination cannot rest merely on statistics. The fact that an 
identifiable minority group votes in a proportion lower than the rest of the population and is therefore 
underrepresented on jury panels presents no constitutional issue.” (emphasis added) (citing United 
States v. Lopez, 588 F.2d 450, 452 (5th Cir. 1979))); United States v. Lopez, 588 F.2d 450, 451–52 (5th 
Cir. 1979) (citing the equal protection case of Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 493 (1977), for the 
rule that a defendant must show that the exclusion of a particular minority group from jury service is 
“due to some form of intentional discrimination”). 
 186. United States v. Ruiz-Castro, 92 F.3d 1519, 1527 (10th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added), overruled 
on other grounds by United States v. Flowers, 464 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2006); see United States v. 
Weaver, 267 F.3d 231, 244–45 (3d Cir. 2001) (responding to the government’s point that “there has 
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relies on non-discriminatory source lists is immune to challenge—just 
like the conclusion that a system that operates in a nondiscriminatory 
manner is immune to challenge—reflects the importation of equal 
protection standards.187 
B. Category B Errors: Focusing on Fault and Opportunities for 
Jurors When Analyzing Systematic Exclusion 
In addition to affirmatively imposing equal protection requirements, 
courts often borrow two concepts from equal protection jurisprudence: a 
focus on fault and a concern with the opportunities of jurors to serve. 
This most commonly occurs in cases where the court has concluded that 
the underrepresentation of African-Americans and/or Hispanics is due to 
the disproportionate failure of people of color to receive the jury 
summons, respond to the jury summons, or make themselves available to 
serve.188 It also occurs in the type of “voter registration claim” cases 
described above.189 
Courts have consistently held that disparity is not the result of 
systematic exclusion when it is due to the failure of people of color to 
receive or return the jury summons.190 Courts reach this conclusion while 
 
been no showing of anything in the system that has discouraged or prevented a group from 
participating,” by noting that “intentional discrimination need not to be shown to prove a Sixth 
Amendment fair cross section claim,” and that “if the use of voter registration lists over time did have 
the effect of sizably underrepresenting a particular class or group on the jury venire, then under some 
circumstances, this would violate the Sixth Amendment”); Bryant v. Wainwright, 686 F.2d 1373, 1378 
n.4 (11th Cir. 1982) (“[I]f the use of voter registration lists as the origin for jury venires were to result 
in a sizeable underrepresentation of a particular class or group on the jury venires, then this could 
constitute a violation of a defendant’s ‘fair cross-section’ rights under the sixth amendment.”); United 
States v. Armsbury, 408 F. Supp. 1130, 1139 (D. Or. 1976) (“I reject the views of those courts which 
hold that the use of voter lists cannot deny a fair cross section unless discrimination in voter 
registration is shown to exist.”); see also United States v. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d 932, 945 (9th Cir. 
2005); United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 677–78 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 187. As explained above, 43 of the 104 “systematic exclusion denials” (41%), were denied at least 
in part on the defendant’s failure to show intentional and discriminatory action: 28 claims were 
explicitly denied at least in part for the failure to show discrimination, 12 for the failure to show race-
based classifications, 6 because the system was not designed to exclude, 6 because selection was done 
by computer, 5 because the intentions of jury officials were benign, and 6 for the failure to show 
discrimination in voter registration. (These numbers add up to more than 43 cases because some 
claims were denied for more than one of these reasons.) Again, my core hypothesis is not that 41% of 
all prong-three denials demand evidence of discrimination, but rather that the requirement of 
discriminatory intent in any fair cross-section claim represents a misapplication of the Duren test 
which infringes on the constitutional rights of defendants, and that it is happening in more cases than 
might be expected. 
 188. In the survey, 4 of the 104 “systematic exclusion claims” involved a Category B error in a 
claim based on disparity resulting from higher rates of undeliverable summons, unanswered summons, 
and failures to appear by people of color. 
 189. In the survey, 20 of the 104 “systematic exclusion claims” involved a Category B error in a 
claim based on disparity resulting from reliance on underrepresentative voter lists. 
 190. See, e.g., Rivas v. Thaler, 432 F. App’x 395, 402–03 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he fact that certain 
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acknowledging evidence that the rate of undeliverable summons191 and 
unreturned summons is higher for people of color,192 and that the jury 
office makes affirmative decisions about to which addresses summons 
will be sent193 and about what actions to take regarding non-responders 
or undeliverable summons.194 Similarly, courts have concluded that there 
is no systematic exclusion in voter registration claim cases.195 This 
conclusion is not affected by the recognition that voter registration lists 
underrepresent African-Americans and Hispanics,196 and that the 
 
groups of persons called for jury service appear in numbers unequal to their proportionate 
representation in the community does not support Rivas’s allegation that Dallas County systematically 
excludes them in its jury selection process.”); Johnson v. Horel, No. C 07-4483 PJH (PR), 2010 WL 
4722634, at *24 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2010) (finding no systematic exclusion where “the disparity in 
representation is attributable to the disproportionately high rate of failure to appear by those 
summoned for service”); Kellogg v. Peterson, No. 178760, 1996 WL 33362172, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. 
Aug. 2, 1996) (“That a certain segment of Detroit residents chose not to respond to questionnaires 
cannot be considered ‘inherent’ to the jury selection process.”); see also United States v. Bates, No. 05-
81027, 2009 WL 5033928, at *16 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 15, 2009); United States v. Purdy, 946 F. Supp. 1094, 
1104 (D. Conn. 1996). 
 191. “Undeliverable” summons are notices that have been returned by the post office as 
undeliverable; unreturned summons, or “non-responses,” are summons that are not returned because 
they were not received or because the individual declined to return it.  
 192. See, e.g., United States v. Barnes, No. 3:94CR112(AHN), 1996 WL 684388, at *5 (D. Conn. 
June 29, 1996) (“[U]nderrepresentation . . . results from the high rate of questionnaires mailed to 
Hispanic communities which are returned as undeliverable.”); United States v. Murphy, No. 94 CR 
794, 1996 WL 341444, at *5 (N.D. Ill. June 18, 1996) (“[P]oor African-Americans failed to respond to 
jury notices at a much higher rate than wealthy whites.”); Commonwealth v. Fryar, 680 N.E.2d 901, 
907 (Mass. 1997) (“[T]he representation of Blacks and Hispanics in the jury pool was adversely 
affected because the communities with the highest percentage of Blacks and Hispanics have the 
highest nonresponse rate.”); see also United States v. Royal, 174 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1999); People v. 
Robinson, No. 285416, 2009 WL 3365778, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2009). 
 193. Gregory E. Mize et al., The State-of-the-States Survey of Jury Improvement Efforts: A 
Compendium Report 15 (2007). 
 194. Id. at 22; see Purdy, 946 F. Supp. at 1104 (citing jurisdiction’s “failure to mail follow-up 
questionnaires to persons who did not respond” to the first summons). 
 195. See, e.g., United States v. Orange, 447 F.3d 792, 800 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Clifford, 
640 F.2d 150, 156 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Rioux, 930 F. Supp. 1558, 1573 (D. Conn. 1995) 
(“[T]he circuits are in complete agreement that use of voter registration lists as the sole source of 
potential jurors comports with the Sixth Amendment.”). 
 196. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 581 F.3d 775, 790 (8th Cir. 2009) (“As African-
Americans and Hispanics in North Dakota participated in the 2004 election at lower rates than the 
state’s whites, the proportion of minorities in the 590-person venire was lower than the overall 
proportion of minorities in North Dakota.”); Barnes, 1996 WL 684388, at *5 (“The 
underrepresentation of Hispanics in the . . . jury system is caused [in part] by . . . . the failure of 
Hispanics to register to vote at the same rate as non-Hispanics.”). The fact that voter registration lists 
underrepresent African-Americans and Hispanics has been widely recognized in the literature. See, 
e.g., Brown, supra note 66, at 446 (“[R]andom selection from the most common source list for juries, 
voter registration rolls, consistently underrepresents racial minorities across both jurisdiction and 
time.”). 
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jurisdiction made an affirmative decision to use the voter lists as the only 
source of juror names.197 
In rejecting both types of claims, courts define the cause of the 
disparity as the fault of the would-be jurors and contrast it with the 
faultless conduct of the jury office. The cases essentially proffer the 
recalcitrant, unavailable potential jurors as an answer to a question the 
Sixth Amendment does not ask: Who is to blame for this disparity? The 
decisions also emphasize the extent to which the opportunity for jurors 
to serve is not inhibited. But the Sixth Amendment is concerned only 
with the rights of defendants; the opportunities denied to would-be 
jurors are exclusively an equal protection question.198 
1. Focus on Fault 
In evaluating the use of voter lists, courts emphasize the “private 
choices”199 of putative jurors to “willfully exclude themselves”200 from the 
jury pool. As the Fourth Circuit chose to put it, the fair cross-section 
right does not address “underrepresentation created simply because 
some members of a class itself had by sloth failed to register.”201 The 
focus on “sloth” or self-exclusion is implicitly contrasted with the actions 
of jury officials. Courts highlight this contrast by explaining, for example, 
that “it was the unfortunate failure of Hispanics either to register to vote 
or to return the jury questionnaires, through no fault or encouragement of 
the court’s jury selection procedures, which may have produced any 
 
 197. States make independent decisions about what source lists to use. Mize, supra note 193, at 13. 
As discussed infra, federal jurisdictions must use voter lists but are required to supplement those lists 
if necessary to achieve a fair cross-section. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2) (2006). 
 198. See Schulberg, supra note 17, at 19–24 (describing the denial of claims based on reliance on 
voter registration lists and the failure to update addresses as a “line of reasoning” that “reflects an 
equal protection paradigm.”). Although other scholars have not defined the focus on the actions of 
jury officials or jurors as a manifestation of equal protection standards, they have highlighted the 
inconsistency between a fair cross-section standard that focuses on results and an analysis that looks at 
intent. See Leipold, supra note 32, at 999–1000. 
 199. Orange, 447 F.3d at 800 (“Discrepancies resulting from the private choices of potential jurors 
do not represent the kind of constitutional infirmity contemplated by Duren.”); see Rioux, 930 F. Supp. 
at 1572 (“Discrepancies resulting from private sector influences rather than affirmative governmental 
action do not reflect the constitutional infirmities contemplated by the systematic exclusion prong of 
Duren.”). 
 200. Le v. State, 913 So. 2d 913, 925 (Miss. 2005); see United States v. Weaver, 267 F.3d 231, 244 
(3d Cir. 2001) (“[W]here substantial representation is traceable solely to the exclusive reliance on 
voter registration lists, and the underrepresented group has freely excluded itself quite apart from the 
system itself, the third prong has not been fulfilled.”); United States v. Pritt, No. 6:09-cr-110-Orl-
28KRS, 2010 WL 2342440, at *5 (M.D. Fla. June 8, 2010) (finding no systematic exclusion where 
disparity occurs “just because a certain group registers to vote in lower proportions than the rest of the 
population”). 
 201. United States v. Cecil, 836 F.2d 1431, 1448 (4th Cir. 1988). 
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underrepresentation of Hispanics on grand juries.”202 The contrast 
between the “voluntary and unencouraged behavior patterns” of people 
of color and the blamelessness of jury officials reflects an underlying 
focus on intent rather than results.203 
Courts likewise emphasize that non-response rates are the fault of 
jurors who refuse to serve, rather than the fault of jury officials.204 In a 
representative example of this culpability contrast, the Northern District 
of Illinois denied a systematic exclusion claim where the evidence 
showed lower jury summons return rates for African-Americans: “The 
jury selection system . . . is not excluding African-Americans as a group, 
but many African-American individuals are excluding themselves by not 
responding to jury questionnaires.”205 Courts characterize the jury offices 
as passive witnesses to the private choices of the only actors with agency, 
the would-be jurors who “cho[o]se not to respond,”206 “fail[] to 
appear,”207 and stubbornly “appear in numbers unequal to their 
proportionate representation in the community.”208 The opinions make 
clear that “jury departments have no control over” these factors.209 As a 
result, courts routinely conclude that a “high nonresponse rate is not a 
factor inherent in the Juror Selection Plan, even though that high 
nonresponse rate, and its effects on the representation of African 
Americans . . . are undeniable.”210 
 
 202. United States v. Ortiz, 897 F. Supp. 199, 205 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (emphasis added). 
 203. People v. Taylor, 743 N.Y.S.2d 253, 263 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002). 
 204. See, e.g., Pritt, 2010 WL 2342440, at *6 (“Pritt has not identified anything inherent in the 
system itself that causes underrepresentation of Blacks and Hispanics. It is rather the private choices 
of individuals that cause any underrepresentation . . . .”); State v. Williams, 525 N.W.2d 538, 544 
(Minn. 1994) (contrasting disparity due to “unfair or inadequate selection procedures used by the 
state” to, for example, “a higher percentage of ‘no shows’ on the part of people belonging to the group 
in question”); Ortiz, 897 F. Supp. at 204 (“[T]heir non-registration is a result of their own inaction; not 
a result of affirmative conduct by others to bar their registration.”); see also Boyd v. City of 
Wilmington, No. Civ. 05-178-SLR, 2007 WL 174135, at *3 (D. Del. Jan. 16, 2007); People v. Robinson, 
No. 285416, 2009 WL 3365778, at *3–4 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2009); State v. Tremblay, No. P1 97-
1816AB, 2003 WL 23018762, at *11 (Sup. Ct. R.I. Mar. 19, 2003). 
 205. United States v. Murphy, No. 94 CR 794, 1996 WL 341444, at *5 (N.D. Ill. June 18, 1996). 
 206. Kellogg v. Peterson, No. 178760, 1996 WL 33362172, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 1996). 
 207. Johnson v. Horel, No. C 07-4483 PJH (PR), 2010 WL 4722634, at *24 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 
2010). 
 208. Riva v. Thaler, 432 F. App’x 395, 402–03 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 209. United States v. Bates, No. 05-81027, 2009 WL 5033928, at *16 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 15, 2009) 
(“[J]ury departments have no control over the decisions of private individuals to complete and return 
juror questionnaires . . . .”). 
 210. Id. Defining disparity that results from the private choices of people not to respond to jury 
summons as outside the scope of Duren is particularly inappropriate—because the disparity in Duren 
was due in part to willful non-responders. As the government pointed out in its brief, “[W]omen are 
automatically included in the jury list. They are excused from jury service only when they take 
affirmative steps to notify the court that they do not wish to serve.” Brief for Petitioner at *8, Duren v. 
Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979) (No. 77-6067), 1978 WL 223238. The disparity was thus due in part to the 
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Courts rely on this same rationale when the issue is the rate of 
undeliverable summons: The “failure” to receive a summons is 
connected to the would-be juror, rather than the jury office.211 As the 
Second Circuit explained, the “inability to serve juror questionnaires 
because they were returned as undeliverable is not due to the system 
itself, but to outside forces, such as demographic changes.”212 It may be 
that “the postal system is to blame,”213 or “stale addresses resulting from 
population mobility,”214 but it is certainly not the fault of the jury system. 
In some cases, courts temper their discussion of the private choices of 
potential jurors with an acknowledgement that such “choices” might be 
the product of socioeconomic factors.215 Recognizing the role of 
socioeconomic factors shifts the discussion away from the “sloth” of 
racial and ethnic groups, but it retains the focus on the non-culpability of 
jury officials. Specifically, courts make clear that the underrepresentation 
connected to socioeconomic factors “are all factors beyond the control of 
the criminal justice system.”216 The focus on the blameworthiness of 
would-be jurors or the blamelessness of jury officials reflects an equal 
protection construct. 
To be clear, the choices of potential jurors or socioeconomic factors 
that affect those choices are not completely irrelevant to the question of 
systematic exclusion.217 But the courts err in directing their discussion at 
 
private choices of women—which jury officials could not control—to refuse to serve on juries. The 
Supreme Court still held, however, that the disparity was the result of systematic exclusion. Duren, 439 
U.S. at 360. 
 211. See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 897 F. Supp. 199, 204 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (“[M]any Hispanics are 
poor. Like other poor people, they are apt to move more frequently than the more affluent, with their 
mail not being forwarded to their new address. Secondly, poor people in general have less reliable mail 
service.”); Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 781 N.E.2d 1253, 1266 (Mass. 2003) (citing data showing that “a 
disproportionate number of undeliverable summonses are addressed to inner city locations” where the 
majority of the state’s Hispanic residents live). 
 212. United States v. Rioux, 97 F.3d 648, 658 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 213. Ortiz, 897 F. Supp. at 205 (“To the extent that the postal system is to blame, the district[] . . . 
cannot be held responsible.”). 
 214. State v. Gibbs, 758 A.2d 327, 334 (Conn. 2000). 
 215. See, e.g., People v. Robinson, No. 285416, 2009 WL 3365778, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 20, 
2009) (“[T]he fact that more African-Americans had higher no-response rates to questionnaires, is not 
due to the system itself, but is due to outside sources, such as demographic or socioeconomic 
changes.”). 
 216. Id. at *3. The Supreme Court has never decided “whether the impact of social and economic 
factors can support a fair-cross-section claim,” and declined to consider the issue in Berghuis v. Smith, 
130 S. Ct. 1382, 1395 n.6 (2010); see California v. Harris, 468 U.S. 1303, 1304 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., 
sitting as a single justice on a motion to stay) (“Whether this sort of jury selection procedure can be 
described as ‘systematically’ excluding classes that do not register to vote in proportion to their 
numbers, and whether the need for efficient jury selection may not justify resort to such neutral lists as 
voter registration rolls even though they do not perfectly reflect population, are by no means open and 
shut questions under Duren.”). 
 217. See infra Part III.C. 
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exonerating jury officials from any connection to the racial disparity—
largely by describing potential jurors as blameworthy and the only actors 
with any agency. These analytical approaches—even considered 
independently of the outcome—reflect equal protection concerns with 
culpability, just as the emphasis on race-neutral policies in the Section 
above reflects an improper concern with the equal protection issue of 
race-based procedures.218 
2. Focus on Opportunities for Citizens to Serve on Juries 
When courts focus on the absence of barriers to voter registration in 
fair cross-section claims, they are often mistakenly adopting the 
discrimination requirement.219 But the discussion of barriers to jury 
service also reflects a more subtle concern with a purely equal protection 
interest: the opportunity for citizens to serve on juries.220 Opinions that 
rely on the unfettered opportunity of citizens to register to vote or serve 
on juries are inconsistent with a standard exclusively concerned with the 
defendant.221 After all, the “fair cross-section principle . . . is designed to 
achieve results, not just assure opportunities.”222 
The concern with juror opportunities is frequently introduced 
through reliance on the JSSA, which functions as a doctrinal Trojan 
horse for the importation of equal protection interests. The JSSA 
requires federal jury selection plans to select the names of prospective 
jurors from voter registration and voter lists.223 As a result, courts 
frequently conclude that the use of voter lists, even when they produce 
underrepresentative jury pools, cannot violate the Sixth Amendment 
because they have been “expressly sanctioned by Congress.”224 
 
 218. See Schulberg, supra note 17, at 23. 
 219. See supra Part II.A.2.  
 220. See Leipold, supra note 32, at 970–71 (“[Focusing on removing] barriers to voter 
registration . . . . makes sense if the goal of the cross-section doctrine is to protect jurors, far less sense 
if we are seeking to protect the accused.”). 
 221. See Williams, supra note 90, at 629 (“Th[e] logic [behind opinions denying voter registration 
claims] confuses the equal protection standard with the sixth amendment standard. The right 
protected by the sixth amendment is not the right of any particular juror to be on the jury source list. 
That right is protected by the equal protection clause.”). 
 222. State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 239 (N.J. 1987) (“[W]e cannot concur in the suggestion, 
frequently made, that jury selection systems based on voter lists are effectively insulated from 
constitutional attack since random selection from a properly compiled voter list can never amount to a 
‘systematic exclusion’ as required under the third prong of the Duren test.”). 
 223. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2) (2006) (requiring that federal jury selection plans “specify whether the 
names of prospective jurors shall be selected from the voter registration lists or the lists of actual 
voters of the political subdivisions within the district or division”). 
 224. Polk v. Hunt, No. 95-5323, 1996 WL 47110, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 5, 1996); see United States v. 
Odeneal, 517 F.3d 406, 412 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Orange, 447 F.3d 792, 800 (10th Cir. 2006); 
United States v. Cecil, 836 F.2d 1431, 1445 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Clifford, 640 F.2d 150, 156 
(8th Cir. 1981). 
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Specifically, courts assert that “Congress has determined that this use of 
voter registration lists meets the Sixth Amendment’s fair cross section 
requirement because everyone has the opportunity to place their name on 
the voter registration list.”225 And indeed, Congress designated voter 
registration lists as a source for jury names in order to further the JSSA’s 
equal protection goals: prohibiting discrimination in jury selection226 and 
providing citizens with the opportunity to serve on juries.227 But a source 
list that ensures equal protection opportunities (and avoids 
discrimination) does not necessarily satisfy the Sixth Amendment right 
to a list that represents a cross-section of the community.228 
Voter lists only serve the JSSA’s additional purpose of selecting 
juries from a fair cross-section229 to the extent that they remain the largest 
available and updated lists.230 Importantly, the JSSA provides that federal 
jury selection plans “shall prescribe some other source or sources of 
names in addition to voter lists where necessary to foster” either the 
equal protection or fair cross-section policies.231 The JSSA thus makes 
clear that voter lists must be supplemented when there is evidence of 
 
 225. State v. Pelican, 580 A.2d 942, 949 (Vt. 1990) (emphasis added); see Cecil, 836 F.2d at 1445 
(“The use of voter registration lists was chosen by Congress in part because it provided each qualified 
citizen with an equal opportunity to cause his name to be among those from which random selection is 
made . . . .”); Clifford, 640 F.2d at 156 (“The use of voter registration lists in almost every instance 
provides each qualified citizen an equal opportunity to be selected in random drawing to serve on a 
petit jury.”); United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 587 n.10 (10th Cir. 1976) (“[I]n adopting the voter 
registration lists as the ‘preferred source’ of names for prospective jurors, Congress . . . intended to 
provide a . . . source of names . . . to which all potential jurors would have equal access . . . .”). 
 226. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2) (“No citizen shall be excluded from service as a grand or petit juror in 
the district courts of the United States or in the Court of International Trade on account of race, color, 
religion, sex, national origin, or economic status.”). 
 227. Id. § 1861 (“It is further the policy of the United States that all citizens shall have the 
opportunity to be considered for service on grand and petit juries in the district courts of the United 
States . . . .”). 
 228. See Williams, supra note 90, at 602–03 (“The JSSA largely solved equal protection problems 
in federal jury source list representativeness by eliminating discretionary procedures that created 
opportunities for discrimination. However, the JSSA did not ensure that the sixth amendment fair-
cross-section requirement would be satisfied.”). 
 229. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (“It is the policy of the United States that all litigants in Federal courts 
entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected at random from a fair 
cross section of the community in the district or division wherein the court convenes.”). 
 230. Cecil, 836 F.2d at 1445 (“[T]he use of voter registration lists was chosen by Congress in part 
because . . . it was the largest generally available random source that was frequently updated.” 
(quoting United States v. Hanson, 472 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (D. Minn. 1979), aff’d, 618 F.2d 1261 (8th 
Cir. 1980))); Test, 550 F.2d at 587 n.10 (“[I]n adopting the voter registration lists as the ‘preferred 
source’ of names for prospective jurors, Congress . . . intended to provide a relatively large and easily 
accessible source of names . . . .”). 
 231. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2) (“The plan shall prescribe some other source or sources of names in 
addition to voter lists where necessary to foster the policy and protect the rights secured by sections 
1861 and 1862 of this title.”). 
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discrimination232 or where those lists are not representative.233 
Accordingly, while it might make sense to cite the JSSA’s use of non-
discriminatory voter registration lists to defeat an equal protection claim, 
the Act does not suggest that the use of non-representative voter lists 
should defeat a fair cross-section claim.234 
The emphasis on opportunities for would-be jurors—like the 
consistent use of language that contrasts the culpability of potential 
jurors with the blamelessness of jury officials—reflects the infiltration of 
equal protection concepts into a Sixth Amendment analysis. 
III.  Harm Resulting from Application of the Contaminated 
Cross-Section Analysis 
The intent-focused analysis described in the preceding Section 
undermines the unique substantive guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, 
fails to take account of how jury systems operate today, and damages the 
integrity of the doctrine. 
A. Undermines Unique Sixth Amendment Protections 
Courts obviate the Sixth Amendment guarantee when they import 
the requirement to show intent and focus on fault, as the use of such a 
tainted test limits the jury rights of defendants to those protected by the 
Equal Protection Clause. What are lost are the unique Sixth Amendment 
protections that go beyond the right to be protected from state 
discrimination.235 
For example, a fair cross-section claim in the District of Connecticut 
revealed that African-Americans and Hispanics were underrepresented 
in the jury pool because no jury summons had ever been sent to either 
 
 232. See Cecil, 836 F.2d at 1448 (“[I]t is likely that Congress, writing in the midst of the civil rights 
legislation, was thinking of the possible vestiges of discrimination in registration to vote that might 
have remained in certain areas and wished to offer some safeguard against that condition by this 
provision for supplementation.”). 
 233. See Jeffrey Abramson, Two Ideals of Jury Deliberation, 1998 U. Chi. Legal F. 125, 156 (1998) 
(“Congress mandated an affirmative or positive requirement that the master jury wheel actually be 
representative of the community.”); Schulberg, supra note 17, at 20 (“[The JSSA] recognized that 
voter registration lists would have to be supplemented if they resulted in underrepresentation of a 
distinct group in jury pools . . . .”). 
 234. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 365 n.23 (1979) (“[T]he fair-cross-section requirement 
involves a comparison of the makeup of jury venires or other sources from which jurors are drawn 
with the makeup of the community, not of voter registration lists.”). 
 235. See United States v. Green, 389 F. Supp. 2d 29, 51 (D. Mass. 2005) (“Even practices that are 
race-neutral but have a disparate impact on the representation of a cognizable class in the jury venire 
fit within the Sixth Amendment’s protections, while they would not be cognizable under the Equal 
Protection clause.”); Brown, supra note 66, at 446 (“The selection of representative cross-sections of 
jurors is a substantive goal that requires different, more closely examined procedures than the more 
limited goal of restricting the impact of discriminatory intent on jury composition.”). 
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Hartford or New Britain, the counties that contained over 60% of the 
voting-age black and Hispanic population.236 The culprit turned out to be 
“a computer programming error [that] had caused the letter ‘d’ in 
‘Hartford’ to communicate to the computer that all potential jurors from 
Hartford were deceased and thus unavailable for jury service.”237 
Interestingly, no explanation was offered for the exclusion of New 
Britain residents, but there was no allegation that it was a purposeful 
exclusion.238 There was no equal protection injury because there was no 
allegation or evidence of discrimination. And indeed, the equal 
protection claim of a defendant tried under the flawed jury system was 
denied because there was no “showing of discriminatory intent.”239 But 
there was still a Sixth Amendment injury because a distinctive group was 
missing from the defendant’s jury pool due to something in the operation 
of the jury selection system.240 In a case like this, if the equal protection 
requirement of intent was imported into the analyses, there would be no 
constitutional remedy for a constitutional injury. 
The problem with eliminating the unique Sixth Amendment 
protection is that the Equal Protection Clause is concerned only with the 
particular damage wrought when the government discriminates.241 It does 
not encompass the Sixth Amendment’s concern for the injury inflicted 
when a criminal defendant is deprived of the safeguard of the 
community’s judgment.242 The constitutional value of the jury is obviated 
if the ultimate decision about life or liberty is made by a jury that does 
not represent the community.243 It is immaterial whether it is 
discrimination, accident, or an unexplainable factor that has produced 
that result: “[I]f the jury pool is made up of only special segments of the 
populace or if large, distinctive groups are excluded from the pool”244 the 
fair cross-section right is violated. 
 
 236. United States v. Jackman, 46 F.3d 1240, 1242 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Osorio, 
801 F. Supp. 966 (D. Conn. 1992)). 
 237. Id. at 1242–43. 
 238. Id. at 1243. 
 239. United States v. Peck, 829 F. Supp. 555, 560 (D. Conn. 1992), overruled on other grounds by 
United States v. Tarascio, 15 F.3d 224, 225 (2d Cir. 1993) (“The Hartford approach was not designed 
to favor towns with lower minority populations . . . . Therefore, absent a showing of discriminatory 
intent underlying the process, the court finds that there has been no Fifth Amendment violation.”). 
 240. United States v. Osorio, 801 F. Supp. 966, 980 (D. Conn. 1992) (noting that the exclusion of 
Hartford and New Britain residents violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair cross-
section of the community). 
 241. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986); see also supra Part I.A. 
 242. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961) (“In the ultimate analysis, only the jury can strip a 
man of his liberty or his life.”); see also supra Part I.A. 
 243. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87 n.8 (“For a jury to perform its intended function as a check on official 
power, it must be a body drawn from the community.”). 
 244. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975). 
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The underrepresentation of African-Americans and Hispanics, in 
particular, diminishes the quality of deliberation about issues frequently 
relevant in criminal trials.245 Whites and people of color have, as a general 
rule,246 different life experiences based in part on race.247 There is 
substantial evidence, presumably as a result of those experiences, that 
people of color (again, as a group if not as individuals) have different 
perspectives on police and the justice system.248 The Supreme Court has 
recognized that jurors’ deliberations are substantively enriched by the 
diverse perspectives brought to bear by people with different life 
experiences. This diversity of experience is particularly important 
because jurors do not simply decide the existence of objective facts, they 
make subjective judgments that depend on discretion, morality, 
determinations of credibility, and life experiences.249 “When cognizable 
segments of the community are excluded from jury participation, the 
 
 245. See, e.g., State v. LaMere, 2 P.3d 204, 212 (Mont. 2000) (“Underlying [the concern for jury 
composition] is the belief in American jurisprudence that a jury constituted of individuals with diverse 
perspectives, coming from the various classes of society, is greater than the sum of its respective parts 
and can better arrive at a common sense judgment about a set of facts than can any individual. . . . In 
short, it is believed that diversity begets impartiality.”); Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, 
How Much Do We Really Know About Race and Juries? A Review of Social Science Theory and 
Research, 78 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 997, 1028 (2003) (“Compared to all-White juries, racially mixed juries 
tended to deliberate longer, discuss more case facts, and bring up more questions about what was 
missing from the trial (e.g., . . . witnesses who did not testify).”). 
 246. Of course, aggregate data about white and black perspectives cannot predict how individual 
black and white people will vote on a particular case. See, e.g., Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 245, 
at 1018 (“In many of the mock juror studies reviewed above, black jurors rated black defendants as 
more likely to be guilty than not and demonstrated conviction rates as high as 80%.”). But as 
explained in Part I.A, the fair cross-section right deals with the aggregate representation of groups in 
the jury system, not the presence of individual group members on the jury. See, e.g., Peters v. Kiff, 
407 U.S. 493, 503–04 (1972) (“It is not necessary to assume that the excluded group will consistently 
vote as a class in order to conclude, as we do, that its exclusion deprives the jury of a perspective on 
human events that may have unsuspected importance in any case that may be presented.”). 
 247. For example, even controlling for other factors, minorities are more likely to be stopped by 
police and are more likely to be arrested. See, e.g., The Sentencing Project, Reducing Racial 
Disparity in the Criminal Justice System: A Manual for Practitioners and Policymakers 2 (2008) 
(citing Fredrik H. Leinfelt, Racial Influences on the Likelihood of Police Searches and Search Hits: A 
Longitudinal Analysis from an American Midwestern City, 79 Police J. 238 (2006)). 
 248. As a general rule, black people are less likely than white people to view the criminal justice 
system as fair. See, e.g., Karen McGuffee et al., Is Jury Selection Fair? Perceptions of Race and the Jury 
Selection Process, 20 Crim. Just. Stud. 445, 452 (2007). African-Americans are also less likely than 
whites to have confidence in the police. See, e.g., Ronald Weitzer & Steven A. Tuch, Race, Class, and 
Perceptions of Discrimination by the Police, 45 Crime & Delinquency 494, 505 (1999). 
 249. See, e.g., Douglas Gary Lichtman, The Deliberative Lottery: A Thought Experiment in Jury 
Reform, 34 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 133, 140 (1996) (“To the extent that jury questions are subjective, 
representative panels make for better decision-makers. . . . Only a representative jury can accurately 
anticipate what society itself would deem to be just were all of its members privy to trial 
information.”). 
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decision-making process of the jury runs the risk of being seriously 
impaired.”250 
Limiting the fair cross-section right to the confines of the Equal 
Protection Clause also ignores the Sixth Amendment’s unique and 
exclusive concern with the criminal defendant.251 In the context of equal 
protection, the interests of both the defendant and would-be jurors 
align—both are harmed by the discriminatory intent of state actors.252 
But in fair cross-section claims, the defendant’s interests might be at odds 
with those of potential jurors. For example, it might further a defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment interest to have jurors arrested on warrants for failure 
to appear for jury service.253 This is presumably not an interest the 
arrested juror shares,254 but that juror’s interests are immaterial to the fair 
cross-section analysis. Similarly, a defendant may decline to raise a cross-
section claim if she is content with unrepresentative jury pool. The right 
belongs only to the defendant: Absent proof of discrimination, jurors 
excluded by this system have no remedy. 
It is an equal protection construct to conceive of the competing 
interests as a split between the defendant and jurors on one side, and the 
state on the other. In the cross-section context, the interests can 
sometimes be split between the defendant on one side—and the jurors 
and the state on the other. The defendant’s right is “not to have the pool 
diminished at the start by the actions or inactions of public officials, nor 
by the inertia, indifference, or inconvenience of any substantial group or 
class who do not choose to vote or to serve on juries.”255 The defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment interest is in having a jury pool that represents the 
community: 
To him it is a matter of indifference as to whether a diminished pool is 
due to action or inaction of third persons, whether public or private. . . . 
In this connection jury duty is an obligation owed to the defendant, not 
 
 250. Smith v. State, 571 S.E.2d 740, 751–52 (Ga. 2002) (Benham, J., dissenting). 
 251. See supra note 65. 
 252. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 88 (1986) (“The harm from discriminatory jury 
selection . . . [is] inflicted on [both] the defendant and the excluded juror . . . .”). 
 253. 28 U.S.C. § 1866(g) (2006) (“Any person summoned for jury service who fails to appear as 
directed may be ordered by the district court to appear forthwith and show cause for failure to comply 
with the summons. Any person who fails to show good cause for noncompliance with a summons may 
be fined not more than $1000, imprisoned not more than three days, ordered to perform community 
service, or any combination thereof.”). 
 254. See Jackson v. Hoylman, 12 F.3d 212 (6th Cir. 1993) (considering a § 1983 claim filed against 
marshals who arrested a man in his home on a bench warrant for failure to appear for grand jury 
service). 
 255. United States v. Burkett, 342 F. Supp. 1264, 1265 (D. Mass. 1972). Burkett is a pre-Duren 
opinion by the late, great Judge Charles E. Wyzanski, “a profound legal thinker,” Eric Pace, Charles 
E. Wyzanski, 80, Is Dead; Judge on U.S. Court for 45 Years, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1986, at A20, who 
clerked for Learned Hand, and “became a member of the ‘brain trust’ of Franklin D. Roosevelt,” 
Progressive District Judge Wyzanski Is Dead at 80, Harvard Crimson, Sept. 5, 1986. 
Chernoff_19 (S. ALESSI) (Do Not Delete) 12/19/2012 3:05 PM 
188 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:101 
 
a privilege which at the juror’s pleasure the juror may choose to 
exercise or forego.256 
Application of the contaminated tests fails to protect the 
defendant’s interests that exist apart from, and sometimes in conflict 
with, the interests of potential jurors. Although the jury office’s 
responsibility for the “action or inaction of third persons” is not 
limitless,257 under the Sixth Amendment, that responsibility is not 
confined to refraining from discrimination.258 
B. Incompatible with Operation of Modern Jury Systems 
A focus on the intent of jury officials also undermines the impartial 
jury right because it fails to take account of how modern jury systems 
actually operate. In the past, the issue of racial exclusion or 
underrepresentation on juries always arose in the context of intentional, 
race-based decisions.259 But a search for a bad actor is not responsive to 
the reality that well-meaning administrators can make racially neutral 
decisions (or inadvertent mistakes) that result in the significant 
underrepresentation of people of color.260 
Computer programming has been introduced into jury selection 
processes to increase efficiency and facilitate random selection, but as the 
Connecticut example illustrates, computers are programmed by humans 
and are accordingly vulnerable to human errors.261 Underrepresentative 
jury pools have been created, for example, by a computer program that 
arranged lists of qualified jurors “alphabetically by the fifth letter of the 
last name,” a system which was “impartial . . . unintentional, . . . blind 
and benign.”262 But the process inadvertently grouped different ethnic 
groups onto the same jury panels: one panel included “an inordinate 
number of persons with apparently Jewish names. [Another] include[d] 
19 of 65 names with apparently Italian names,” and in another, “10% of 
 
 256. Burkett, 342 F. Supp. at 1265. 
 257. The administrative burden of selecting juries from a cross-section of the community may be 
considerable, but it cannot be implicitly prioritized over the Sixth Amendment right at stake. See infra 
Part III.C. 
 258. See Leipold, supra note 32, at 971 (“[T]he government’s obligation to do more than remove 
barriers seemed to be the message of Duren v. Missouri.”); Schulberg, supra note 17, at 24 (“At the 
very least, the fair cross-section requirement imposes a duty on jury officials to adopt procedures to 
remedy underrepresentation.”). 
 259. McGillis, supra note 39, at 20. 
 260. See People v. Morales, 770 P.2d 244, 276 (Cal. 1989) (Broussard, J., dissenting) (“The 
Fourteenth Amendment protects against intentional discrimination in the selection of venires, but the 
Sixth Amendment protects against unintentional deviations from the constitutional standard.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 261. See supra notes 236–238 and accompanying text. 
 262. State v. Long, 499 A.2d 264, 268 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law Div. 1985). 
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the panel [had] the last name ‘Williams.’”263 Other jurisdictions created 
underrepresentative jury pools when a computer error accidentally set 
the parameters for the selection of names such that only the lower 
number zip codes were used as a source of names, and the urban area 
with the largest percentage of people of color had a higher number zip 
code.264 Elsewhere, a system organized the townships in the jury pool in 
alphabetical order and limited jury summons to the first 10,000 jurors on 
the list, thereby excluding “Wayne Township” residents, who constituted 
75.1% of the county’s African-American population.265 In Washington, 
D.C., a computer programming error excluded all persons with 
misdemeanor convictions (where the law only disqualified persons with 
felony convictions), and permanently excluded from jury service any 
person who had indicated a temporary disqualification because they had 
a pending criminal charge or had not yet satisfied the residency 
requirement.266 Even properly functioning computer programs have had 
unexpected results: One program for identifying duplicate names to 
eliminate from the jury list compared the full last name and the first four 
letters of the first name; if there was a match, the name was dropped 
from the jury list.267 But because “many members of the Hispanic 
community share common surnames and first names” the evidence 
showed that Hispanics were likely erroneously deleted.268 
Other innocuous steps taken by jury officials, often in an effort to 
make jury service less onerous, have inadvertently led to 
underrepresentative pools. For example, a county in Alaska sought to 
make jury service less burdensome by limiting the selection of jurors to 
people who lived within fifteen miles of the courthouse, which had the 
unintended effect of eliminating “residents of virtually all Native 
villages” from the jury pool.269 Efforts to send jurors to courthouses 
closer to their residence similarly resulted in the underrepresentation of 
African-Americans in Los Angeles County,270 New York,271 and Florida.272 
 
 263. Id. at 269 n.3. 
 264. Ambrose v. Booker, 781 F. Supp. 2d 532, 538 (E.D. Mich. 2011); see also People v. Bryant, 
No. 241442, 2004 WL 513664, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2004) (“[A] computer program used to 
select potential jurors chose a disproportionately large number of jurors from areas with lower zip 
codes, which had the unintended effect of selecting fewer jurors from areas of the county where 
African-Americans live.”). 
 265. Azania v. State, 778 N.E.2d 1253, 1257–59 (Ind. 2002). 
 266. United States v. Powell, Daily Wash. L. Rptr., Oct. 3, 2008, at 2149 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Crim. 
June 17, 2008). 
 267. People v. Ramirez, 139 P.3d 64, 94 (Cal. 2006). 
 268. Id. 
 269. Alvarado v. State, 486 P.2d 891, 895 (Ala. 1971) (deciding, pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, 
a fair cross-section right despite being a pre-Duren case). 
 270. People v. Jenkins, 997 P.2d 1044, 1100 (Cal. 2000); see also Hiroshi Fukurai & Edgar W. 
Butler, Sources of Racial Disenfranchisement in the Jury and Jury Selection System, 13 Nat’l Black 
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The potential for innocuous juror assignment policies to cause racial 
disparities was vividly demonstrated in Berghuis v. Smith.273 The 
defendant in Smith was an African-American man convicted of murder 
by an all-white jury, selected from a venire that included three African-
Americans out of a group of between 60 and 100 people, in a county 
where 7.28 percent of the jury-eligible population was black.274 His jury 
had been selected through a process where eligible jurors were sent first 
to local courts and, after local needs were filled, were sent to countywide 
courts that heard felony cases like Smith’s.275 The month after Smith’s 
jury had been selected, however, the county reversed the assignment 
order276 because the Jury Office concluded that the assignment order 
“essentially swallowed up most of the minority jurors, leaving [felony 
courts like Smith’s] with a jury pool that did not represent the entire 
county.”277 This conclusion was joined by the Jury Minority 
Representation Committee of the Bar Association.278 For example, “in 
the six months prior to Smith’s trial, African-Americans were, on 
average, 18% less likely, when compared to the overall jury-eligible 
population, to be on the jury-service list.”279 And, in fact, when the 
county discontinued the assignment policy, “the comparative disparity, 
on average, dropped from 18% to 15.1%.”280 Smith did not prevail 
because, pursuant to the Court’s arguably narrow reading of Duren,281 his 
 
L.J. 238, 256–58 (1994). 
 271. See, e.g., People v. Henderson, 490 N.Y.S.2d 94, 96–97 (Buffalo City Ct. 1985) (“In the instant 
case the proof has shown that Blacks are called 61% less frequently in a county-based jury pool than if 
they were drawn from a pool made up only of residents of the City of Buffalo, and Hispanics 45% less 
frequently . . . . Their relative exclusion occurs because they are represented in greater numbers in an 
urban setting and the City of Buffalo, the largest city in the county, has the only local court in the 
county of sufficient size to require it to operate during regular daytime hours and thus the only local 
court that is compatible with a central jury pool. Therefore Blacks and Hispanics are not excluded 
from the jury pool by reason of any discriminatory purpose. Their exclusion is an inadvertent effect of 
an effort to set up, as far as practicable, a central jury pool for the entire county.”). 
 272. See Spencer v. State, 545 So. 2d 1352, 1353–54 (Fla. 1989) (noting that the separation of 
division into two districts was designed “to reduce substantial travel time for jurors and alleviate 
unnecessary expense to the state” but served to “remove[] from the jury pool for [one] district a 
significant concentration of the black population”). 
 273. Berghuis v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 1382 (2010). 
 274. Id. at 1389–90. 
 275. Id. at 1388. 
 276. Id. at 1389. 
 277. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 278. Id. at 1389–90. 
 279. Id. at 1390. 
 280. Id. 
 281. It was true that “the record established that some officials and others in [the] County believed 
that the assignment order created racial disparities, and the County reversed the order in response,” 
but “the belief was not substantiated by Smith’s evidence.” Id. at 1394. And it was true that “Smith’s 
best evidence of systematic exclusion was . . . [the] decline in comparative underrepresentation, from 
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“evidence scarcely shows that the assignment order he targets caused 
underrepresentation,”282 but the facts of his claim highlight the potential 
effects of non-discriminatory jury selection policies. 
Similarly, an effort to “reduce the likelihood that some prospective 
jurors in the jury wheel will be selected for jury duty more often than 
others” by assigning jurors a rank based on times of service had the 
inadvertent result of underrepresenting African-Americans and 
Hispanics.283 And the decision to grant all deferral requests and group the 
deferred jurors together for later jury selection—when deferral requests 
were disproportionately made by whites—has also led to jury pools that 
underrepresented people of color.284 Underrepresentation can also be 
caused by the numeric increment used to randomly select jurors from the 
jury pool285 or the use of telephones to summon jurors.286 Finally, when a 
source list is not racially representative, even random, race-neutral 
selection from that list by a computer program will produce an 
underrepresentative jury pool. “[M]any ‘random’ procedures regularly 
yield very predictable, non-random deficiencies in their outcomes.”287 
 
18 to 15.1%, after [the] County reversed the assignment order,” but “in view of AEDPA’s 
instruction . . . this decrease could not fairly be described as ‘a big change.’” Id. (quoting 
acknowledgement by counsel for Smith at oral argument). Most importantly, Smith had identified “a 
host of factors” in addition to the assignment order that he claimed contributed to the 
underrepresentation but no “‘clearly established’ precedent of this Court supports Smith’s claim that 
he can make out a prima facie case merely by pointing to a host of factors that, individually or in 
combination, might contribute to a group’s underrepresentation.” Id. at 1388. This was one of the 
“marked differences between Smith’s case and Duren’s,” and the Court accordingly concluded that 
the state court’s rejection of Smith’s fair cross-section claim did not represent an “unreasonable 
application of clearly established federal law.” Id. at 1391. See supra note 113, for a critique of the 
Court’s comparison of Smith and Duren’s proffers. 
 282. Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 1394. 
 283. Washington v. People, 186 P.3d 594, 597–98 (Colo. 2008).  
 284. United States v. Clay, 159 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1362–64 (M.D. Ala. 2001). 
 285. State v. Hester, 324 S.W.3d 1, 44 (Tenn. 2010) (“[T]he increment used to draw names from 
the driver’s license list changes when a new venire is selected. These changes have a significant effect 
on the drawing of names from the list. . . . [A]ssuming [the county’s] Hispanic population generally is 
at the end of the list because Hispanics disproportionately have higher driver’s license numbers . . . 
decreasing the increment will have a tendency to increase the possibility that Hispanics will not be 
considered for jury service.”). 
 286. See State v. LaMere, 2 P.3d 204, 221 (Mont. 2000) (noting that the use of the telephone to 
summon jurors resulted in an underrepresentative pool when 29% of Native American households in 
one county have no phone service, while “[i]n stark contrast . . . only 5% [of Anglo-American 
households in the same county] are without phone service”); see also United States v. Nakai, 413 F.3d 
1019, 1022 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 287. Brown, supra note 66, at 446 (“For instance, random selection from the most common source 
list for juries, voter registration rolls, consistently underrepresents racial minorities across both 
jurisdiction and time.”). See Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1, 23 (5th Cir. 1966) (“Even random selection 
from broad lists, such as voter registration records . . . inescapably requires a basic preliminary test: do 
each, or all, or some, give a true picture of the community and its components?”). 
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None of these errors reflect intentional discrimination or even 
intentional action, as courts have recognized: “[A]s often happens in 
overburdened courts (like other institutions), the failure to adopt a 
proper procedure might have resulted simply from the unwarranted 
assumptions by all concerned” that the system is operating as it should.288 
But notwithstanding the absence of discriminatory or purposeful action, 
each of these errors introduce the possibility that a defendant will be 
deprived of her Sixth Amendment right to a jury selected from a fair 
cross-section of the community. Thus an analysis limited to identifying 
instances of discriminatory intent will fail to remedy cross-section 
violations occasioned by these modern-day errors. 
The focus on the equal protection questions of fault and 
opportunities for people to serve on juries similarly fails to take account 
of the ways modern jury systems affect ostensibly private choices. For 
example, every jury office has to make a decision whether to send 
potential jurors a single form that combines a summons to jury service 
and a jury qualification form (a one-step process), or to send the 
qualification form first and then send the summons to those who qualify 
(a two-step process). Data from the National Center for State Court’s 
State-of-the-States Survey demonstrate that this decision by the jury 
office can significantly affect the rates of undeliverable mailings, non-
response rates, and failures to appear.289 A focus on fault and the private 
choices of jurors masks the reality that the affirmative choices that jury 
offices make (in conjunction with the actions of potential jurors) affect 
the “private choices” that contribute to underrepresentative jury pools. 
Indeed, there is substantial evidence that jury systems’ operational 
choices significantly influence the very factors that courts attribute to the 
private choices of citizens. The Center for Jury Studies of the National 
Center for State Courts documents that jurisdictions have affected the 
“private choices” of citizens to exercise requests for excusals (by shifting 
to a one-day or one-trial service term290 or increasing the amount of juror 
pay291), the “private choices” of citizens to appear for jury service (by 
following up on or enforcing unreturned summons),292 and the 
 
 288. United States v. Jackman, 46 F.3d 1240, 1245 (2d Cir. 1995).  
 289. Systems that chose the one-step process have an average undeliverable rate of 14.6%, and 
states that chose the two-step process have an average undeliverable rate of 9.2%. Mize et al., supra 
note 193, at 22 tbl.16. Similarly, offices that chose a one-step process have non-response/failure to 
appear rates at an average of 8.9%, compared to 6% for offices that chose the two-step process. Id. 
 290.  Id. at 24 tbl.18 (“[C]ourts with a one day or one trial term of service had significantly lower 
excusal rates than those with longer terms of service (6.0 percent versus 8.9 percent, respectively).”). 
 291. Id. at 23 (“Moreover, courts with juror fees exceeding the national average ($21.95 flat fee or 
$32.34 graduated rate) also had significantly lower excusal rates—6.8 percent compared to 8.9 percent 
for courts whose juror fees were lower than the national average.”). 
 292. Id. at 24–25 (“[F]ollow-up programs that involved a second summons or qualification, or that 
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socioeconomic factors that affect the rate of undeliverable summons (by 
using an address-updating service293 and updating addresses more 
frequently294). In sum, “courts have implemented a number of effective 
practices to ensure an inclusive and representative master jury list . . . . 
All of these techniques demonstrably improve the demographic 
representation of the jury pool.”295 Courts implicitly recognize this point 
when they hold there is no systematic exclusion, but proceed to order 
changes to the jury system anyway.296 When courts limit their focus to the 
question of whether citizens have been denied the opportunity to serve 
on juries, they fail to consider how jury offices affect the “private” choice 
to take advantage of that opportunity. 
C. Erodes Doctrinal Integrity 
Courts’ application of the contaminated test, in the words of one 
dissenting judge, reflects “their inability or unwillingness to comprehend 
the difference between an equal protection analysis and a representative 
cross-section analysis.”297 Although it is not clear which of the two is to 
blame, if we assume the normative value of competent judges298 and 
internally consistent doctrine,299 then either courts’ inability to distinguish 
the doctrines or their unwillingness to do so threatens both the integrity 
of the law and public acceptance of judicial decisions.300 
 
involved some other approach (e.g., bench warrant), significantly reduced non-response/FTA rates.”); 
id. at 25 (“Courts that had no follow-up program had significantly higher non-response/FTA rates.”); 
Hannaford-Agor, supra note 17, at 784 (“[T]he enforcement of jury summonses can be highly effective 
in ensuring a representative jury pool—a phenomenon documented by numerous studies conducted in 
state and local courts.”). To be clear, Hannaford-Agor adopted (and arguably endorsed) the definition 
of disparity related to voter registration non-response rates as “nonsystematic exclusion.” Id. at 772. 
 293. Hannaford-Agor, supra note 17, at 783. 
 294. Id. at 788. 
 295. Id. at 764. 
 296. See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, No. 94 CR 794, 1996 WL 341444, at *5 (N.D. Ill. June 18, 
1996) (noting that, after the court decided to send additional mailings to people who failed to respond 
to the summons, “the percentage of African-Americans on the master and qualified jury wheels 
increased with each subsequent mailing”). 
 297. People v. Bell, 778 P.2d 129, 170 (Cal. 1989) (en banc) (Broussard, J., dissenting).  
 298. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 217 (1980) (citing “the public interest in a competent 
and independent judiciary”); In re Loyd, 384 N.W.2d 9, 13 (Mich. 1986) (“[T]he maintenance of the 
public’s confidence in a competent judiciary is of utmost importance.”). 
 299. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 920 (2010) (citing the value of “evenhanded, 
predictable, and consistent development of legal principles” and ensuring that “the law will not merely 
change erratically, but will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion”); Judge Pierre N. Leval, 
Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1258–59 (2006) (“[Stare Decisis] 
was designed to keep courts principled and consistent—to prevent courts from acting arbitrarily or 
capriciously, deciding the same facts one way in Jones’s case and another way in Smith’s case.”). 
 300. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 763, 793 (2002) (“Courts, in our system, 
elaborate principles of law in the course of resolving disputes. The power and the prerogative of a 
court to perform this function rest, in the end, upon the respect accorded to its judgments.”). 
Chernoff_19 (S. ALESSI) (Do Not Delete) 12/19/2012 3:05 PM 
194 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:101 
 
The best evidence that courts are simply making a mistake, rather 
than affirmatively attempting to modify the doctrine, is the absence of 
any opinions explaining why—or even acknowledging—that the court is 
applying a modified version of the cross-section test. My research 
uncovered only one case where the court recognized that it was applying 
the standard from equal protection, and it did so under protest. In United 
States v. Rogers, the Eighth Circuit recognized that in a prior cross-
section case, “our court introduced an element of intentional 
discrimination not required by the Supreme Court.”301 Notwithstanding 
their awareness that the discrimination requirement was erroneously 
imported, the court’s hands were tied by the earlier case.302 With the 
exception of Rogers, I have not identified a single case in which a court 
acknowledged that it was introducing a requirement not found in Duren, 
or that it was borrowing from the equal protection standard. Moreover, 
the few dissenting judges who have criticized the majority’s application 
of the tainted test have not objected to the majority’s rationale; instead, 
they have accused the majority of making an ill-considered error.303 
To the extent that the distorted doctrine can be attributed to 
mistakes, the problem may lie with the intertwined development of the 
two constitutional standards combined with the operation of precedent.304 
For example, in 2010 the Eighth Circuit denied a defendant’s fair cross-
section claim in United States v. Tripp, asserting that the Constitution 
“merely prohibits deliberate exclusion of an identifiable racial group 
from the juror selection process.”305 The Tripp court was quoting a 1982 
 
 301. United States v. Rogers, 73 F.3d 774, 776 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Our court stated: ‘Garcia does not 
contend that Iowa law imposes any suspect voter registration qualifications or that the Plan is 
administered in a discriminatory manner. Garcia has not made any showing that African Americans or 
Hispanics are systematically excluded from the jury-selection process. A numerical disparity alone 
does not violate any of Garcia’s rights and thus will not support a challenge to the Iowa Plan.’” 
(quoting United States v. Garcia, 991 F.2d 489, 491 (8th Cir.1993))). 
 302. Id. at 776 (“Although we affirm [the defendant’s] convictions, we do so reluctantly with 
respect to [the defendant’s] challenge of the Iowa jury-selection plan. We recognize that we are bound 
by a previous decision by our court . . . . Nevertheless, we feel compelled to discuss our concerns on 
this issue and to encourage the court en banc to reconsider Garcia on this appeal.”). 
 303. See, e.g., Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 1004 (5th Cir. 1985) (Bownes, J., dissenting, joined by 
Coffin, J.) (“[M]y colleagues focus only on the law of equal protection challenges to the exclusion of 
sixth amendment principles. Their finding that evidence of intentional discrimination is required is 
directly counter to the law the Court stated in [Duren] . . . .”). 
 304. See generally Leval, supra note 299, at 1256 (“[The mistake of accepting] prior dictum as if it 
were binding law [] results in some part from time pressures on an overworked judiciary, the ever-
increasing length of judicial opinions, and the precision-guided weaponry of computer research—all of 
which contribute to our taking previously uttered statements out of context, without a careful reading 
to ascertain the role they played in the opinion.”). 
 305. United States v. Tripp, 370 F. App’x 753, 759 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Jones, 
687 F.2d 1265, 1269 (8th Cir. 1982)). 
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decision306 that itself quoted a pre-Duren opinion307 that in turn quoted 
the seminal equal protection case of Swain v. Alabama.308 Confusing the 
two standards is an error even venerable judges have made.309 It may be 
due to the fact that busy clerks and judges have little time to track down 
the origins of oft-cited language, and as a result the wrong standards 
have the opportunity to work their way into the Sixth Amendment 
analysis.310 The likelihood of getting mixed up increases with every 
opinion that muddles the tests, and confused parties contribute to the 
confusion of the courts.311 
Although it may be understandable that courts mistakenly import 
equal protection standards, it is less obvious why they appear content to 
keep making that mistake. Consider the Eighth Circuit cases discussed 
 
 306. Id. 
 307. United States v. Jones, 687 F.2d 1265, 1269 (8th Cir. 1982) (quoting United States v. Turcotte, 
558 F.2d 893, 895 (8th Cir. 1977)). 
 308. United States v. Turcotte, 558 F.2d 893, 895 (8th Cir. 1977) (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 
U.S. 202, 208 (1965)). 
 309. For example, Judge Posner authored an en banc opinion that stated, “The Sixth Amendment 
has been interpreted to forbid racial discrimination in the selection of jurors,” found the defendant’s 
“only evidence of racial discrimination” wanting, and concluded that “[s]ystematic discrimination . . . 
has not been shown.” United States v. Gometz, 730 F.2d 475, 478 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc). Similarly, 
Justice Kennedy cited Duren and Taylor in asserting that “[t]here is no doubt under our precedents, 
therefore, that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits sex discrimination in the selection of jurors.” 
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 152 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring). But, of course, 
Duren and Taylor are Sixth Amendment cases that expressly disavow the equal protection framework. 
See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 335, 364 n.19 (1979) (“The decision below also rejected petitioner’s 
challenge under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This challenge has not 
been renewed before this Court.”); id. at 370 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The Court steadfastly 
maintained in [Taylor] . . . that its holding rested on the jury trial requirement of the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments and not on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 310. For example, in 2004 the Seventh Circuit analyzed a challenge to “the jury composition under 
the Sixth Amendment, which forbids racial discrimination in the selection of jurors.” United States v. 
Phillips, 239 F.3d 829, 842 (7th Cir. 2001). Phillips cited Swain v. Alabama, a seminal equal protection 
case, in concluding that the defendants “fail to make a showing under the third prong that there was a 
systematic exclusion of African Americans and Hispanics.” Id. The cited portion of Swain recites the 
premise that “a State’s purposeful or deliberate denial to Negroes on account of race of participation 
as jurors in the administration of justice violates the Equal Protection Clause.” Swain v. Alabama, 
380 U.S. 202, 203–04 (1965); see State v. Golphin, 533 S.E.2d 168, 192 (N.C. 2000) (“As to the third 
prong of Duren, . . . ’[t]he fact that a particular jury or series of juries does not statistically reflect the 
racial composition of the community does not in itself make out an invidious discrimination forbidden 
by the [Equal Protection] Clause.’” (quoting the equal protection case Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 
229, 239 (1976))); United States v. Biaggi, 680 F. Supp. 641, 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (noting that fair cross-
section decision that imported equal protection concepts “relied upon cases . . . that were actually 
decided pursuant to law other than the Sixth Amendment,” including equal protection and the Jury 
Selection and Service Act). 
 311. See, e.g., Brief for the United States at 79–80, United States v. Quiroz, 37 F. App’x 667 (5th 
Cir. 2005) (No. 03-50120), 2005 WL 2480726. (“The Sixth Amendment forbids racial discrimination in 
the selection of jurors, requiring that the jury venire from with the petit jury is selected represents a 
fair cross-section of the community.”). 
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above: Despite being alerted to the problem in 1996 by the Rogers panel, 
in 2010 the court in Tripp is still relying on equal protection case law to 
demand evidence of discrimination.312 The inconsistencies in Second 
Circuit fair cross-section doctrine provide another prime illustration both 
that the introduction of equal protection is a mistake and that courts can 
continue to make that mistake even after the error is brought to their 
attention. 
The Second Circuit originally held in United States v. Young that 
reliance on voter lists was constitutional, “absent a showing of 
discrimination in the compiling of such voter registration lists,”313 and 
further held that when “defendants have made no showing that any part 
of the process of selecting the venire was tainted by discrimination, [they] 
have therefore failed to establish a prima facie violation of their sixth 
amendment right to a cross-sectional jury panel.”314 Judge Constance 
Baker Motley315 critiqued the Young decision in a subsequent district 
court case, pointing out that Young’s “approach appears to obliterate the 
substantive distinction between the equal protection and sixth 
amendment tests.”316 It was not only inconsistent with an earlier Second 
Circuit decision recognizing that the Sixth Amendment applies 
“regardless of whether the State’s motive is discriminatory;”317 it was also 
“flatly contradictory of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Duren,” because 
“Duren permits the defendant to focus solely on the composition of the 
venires over time, not on the intent of the registrars.”318 
The Second Circuit acknowledged that it had made a mistake. On 
appeal from Judge Motley’s decision, the Second Circuit admitted that it 
“arguably blurred that distinction” between the two constitutional 
standards, and reasserted that it “agree[s] with Judge Motley that 
discriminatory intent is not an element of a Sixth Amendment ‘fair cross-
section claim.’”319 But then in 2009, the equal protection requirement was 
 
 312. United States v. Tripp, 370 F. App’x at 753, 759 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 313. Biaggi, 680 F. Supp. at 653 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Young, 822 F.2d 1234, 
1239 (2d Cir. 1987)). 
 314. Young, 822 F.2d at 1240. 
 315. Judge Motley’s legal experience and acumen likely made her less inclined to apply a slipshod 
analysis to questions of discrimination or underrepresentation. Motley, the first African-American 
woman ever to argue a case before the U.S. Supreme Court or be appointed to a federal court 
judgeship, was the attorney for the petitioner before the Supreme Court in several landmark civil 
rights cases, including James Meredith’s effort to be the first black student to attend the University of 
Mississippi in 1962. Of the ten cases she argued before the Supreme Court, Motley lost only one: the 
seminal equal protection case regarding jury discrimination, Swain, 380 U.S. 202 (Swain was 
eventually overturned in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986)). 
 316. Biaggi, 680 F. Supp. at 653. 
 317. Id. (quoting Alston v. Manson, 791 F.2d 255, 258–59 (2d. Cir. 1986)).  
 318. Id. 
 319. United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 677–78 (2d Cir. 1990). 
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reintroduced by a different panel of the court which held that “absent 
positive evidence that some groups have been hindered in attempting to 
register to vote, a jury venire drawn from voter registration lists violates 
neither the Sixth Amendment’s fair cross-section requirement nor the 
Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of Equal Protection.”320 The 2009 decision 
ignored without discussion Judge Motley’s criticism and the correction 
articulated by the prior panel. Similarly, other courts have imposed the 
wrong standard in the face of critiques from their judicial colleagues321 
and the significant body of law highlighting the differences between the 
two tests.322 
But if it is not simply a mistake, what could explain the willingness 
of courts to apply an incorrect standard that curtails access to 
representative juries? An exploration of that question is outside the 
scope of this Article, but one can imagine both doctrinal and outcome-
based reasons that courts might resist applying the cross-section standard 
stripped of the equal protection discrimination requirement. Perhaps 
courts are resistant to the Duren doctrine either because they are more 
comfortable with a doctrine that interprets racial disparity as the product 
of a malevolent bad actor, rather than the result of unconscious bias or 
benign actions,323 or because they agree with Justice Rehnquist that the 
separate Sixth Amendment right rests on a faulty premise324 and are 
introducing equal protection concepts in an end-run effort to mitigate the 
“harm” introduced by an illegitimate doctrine.325 (Of course, adoption of 
this theory would require the Court to reverse Duren and Smith, an 
approach that at least one state’s Attorney General’s office is pursuing in 
ongoing litigation.326) Perhaps courts do not identify the outcome of 
 
 320. United States v. Carter, No. 07-5756, 2009 WL 765004, at *1 (2d Cir. Mar. 25, 2009) 
(reasoning that, because the defendant has presented no evidence that “members of any ethnic group 
had been hindered in their attempts to register to vote . . . and did not show any other kind of 
systematic exclusion of ethnic minorities,” there was no Sixth Amendment violation). 
 321. See supra note 166. 
 322. See supra note 118. 
 323. Linda Hamilton Kreiger discussed this phenomenon in the context of Title VII employment 
discrimination claims, observing that the doctrinal model has failed to take account of the shift from 
“conscious, deliberate discrimination” to “forms of intergroup bias stemming from social 
categorization and the cognitive distortions which inexorably flow from it.” Linda Hamilton Krieger, 
The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment 
Opportunity, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1161, 1241 (1995). Kreiger argues that the manner in which “Title VII 
jurisprudence constructs discrimination, while sufficient to address the deliberate discrimination 
prevalent in an earlier age, is inadequate to address the subtle, often unconscious forms of bias that . . . 
represent today’s most prevalent type of discrimination.” Id. at 1164.  
 324. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 335, 370–71 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  
 325. See Re, supra note 33, at 1602 (suggesting that when Justice Kennedy referred to Taylor and 
Duren as equal protection cases, he was “tacitly endors[ing a] . . . revisionist interpretation” of Taylor 
and Duren that understands the cases to actually be based on equal protection principles). 
 326. Brief on Appeal of Attorney General Bill Schuette as Amicus at 17, People v. Bryant, 
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underrepresentative jury pools as a harm that truly needs remedying, 
either because they do not feel any affinity for a legal rule that 
recognizes race “matters,”327 or because they recognize race does matter 
but are not invested in seeing the perspective of people of color 
represented in jury pools,328 or because they do not place much value on 
decision making by juries of any composition.329 
Perhaps—at least with respect to cases where the analysis is focused 
on fault—judges are wary of embracing a rule that would impose 
unreasonable burdens on jury officials to operate representative jury 
systems. Indeed, at some point the responsibility of the jury office to 
ensure a fair cross-section ends, and the private choices of citizens 
control. But as yet, courts have not addressed the question of where to 
draw that line or how to apportion the responsibility. Instead, they have 
employed a binary paradigm that assumes the jury system has no 
influence on juror participation rates—an assumption that the evidence 
shows is incorrect.330 There is no reason why a principled limitation on 
the definition of “systematic exclusion” cannot be formulated in a way 
that is both consistent with Duren and avoids placing an unreasonable 
burden on jury officials. But it will never be articulated or deliberated if 
courts implicitly prioritize administrative interests over fair cross-section 
 
491 Mich. 575 (2012) (No. 141741) (arguing that the fair cross-section right announced in Duren “is no 
longer necessary, should be overruled, and that all claims regarding jury composition should be 
evaluated under the equal protection clause”). This argument was also made by the Criminal Justice 
Legal Foundation, in its amicus brief to the Supreme Court in Berghuis v. Smith. Brief Amicus Curiae 
of the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioner at 1, Berghuis v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 
1382 (2010) (No. 08-1402), 2009 WL 4307581. Andre Leipold has also asserted that “the fair cross-
section doctrine in its current form [is not] really necessary,” but his focus is on the “Court’s inability 
to articulate a more vigorous defense of diverse juries” rather than the absence of such a defense. 
Leipold, supra note 32, at 996 (emphasis added). As Leipold observes, “such a defense is not hard to 
make.” Id. 
 327. See generally Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 1589, 1595 (2009) (describing the 
legal theory of post-racialism that “race does not matter, and should not be taken into account or even 
noticed”). Recognizing that race matters in the context of jury selection up until the point that the 
petit jury is chosen, moreover, is in tension with the equal protection prohibition on considering race 
during petit jury selection. See, e.g., Leipold, supra note 32, at 964 (“Although the cross-section 
doctrine is premised on the notion that different races and genders often view the world differently, 
Batson has declared these differences legally irrelevant.”); Chhablani, supra note 17, at 946 
(“Consider . . . the doctrinal paradox that has arisen between the ‘fair cross-section’ jurisprudence and 
the Court’s jurisprudence regarding discrimination in jury selection.”). 
 328. See, e.g., Tanya E. Coke, Lady Justice May Be Blind, but Is She a Souls Sister? Race-Neutrality 
and the Idea of Representative Juries, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 327, 347 (1994) (“[M]any lawyers and judges 
still tend to view whites as presumptively impartial on legal controversies, especially those with racial 
implications. By contrast, racial minorities are seen as self-interested on such issues, as though they are 
marked by ‘race’ but whites are not.” (footnote omitted)). 
 329. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156–57 (1968) (“We are aware of the long 
debate . . . as to the wisdom of permitting untrained laymen to determine the facts in civil and criminal 
proceedings.”). 
 330. See supra Part III.B. 
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interests, using the language of equal protection law rather than 
explaining their analysis.331 
The key point is that courts have not proffered any of these 
explanations for their application of equal protection standards; they 
have provided no explanations at all. Thus, it is impossible to determine 
whether the fault lies with “their inability or unwillingness” to distinguish 
the doctrines, and it follows that any arguments for modifying the Duren 
standard—from the objectionable to the persuasive—are left unstated 
and unexamined. The unexplained distortion of the fair cross-section 
standard undermines the coherence of Sixth Amendment doctrine and 
public confidence in the expertise of the court.332 
Conclusion 
“One thing is, or should be, clear: Sixth Amendment analysis does 
not require proof that a cognizable group has been excluded [from the 
jury pool] because of discrimination, as in the case of an Equal 
Protection challenge . . . .”333 Yet as this Article reveals, the distinction 
between the two constitutional standards is extremely unclear to many 
courts. It is accordingly inappropriate (or at least premature) to suggest 
that the Duren standard needs to be revisited, or that courts should 
employ an alternative framework when evaluating cross-section claims. 
The rights of criminal defendants will be better protected if courts simply 
apply the unadulterated Sixth Amendment standard. 
It will require additional scholarship to explore how often the 
importation of equal protection concepts results in the denial of a 
meritorious claim,334 how frequently courts make this error,335 why courts 
 
 331. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986) (“We should not lightly create a new judicial 
rule, in the guise of constitutional interpretation, to achieve [a desired] end.”); Youngberg v. Romeo, 
457 U.S. 307, 320 (1982) (stating that the government’s interest in avoiding administrative burdens 
cannot unilaterally justify the violation of fundamental rights); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 535 
(1975) (reasoning that “the administrative convenience” of the state’s approach that systematically 
excluded women “is insufficient justification for diluting the quality of community judgment 
represented by the jury in criminal trials”). 
 332. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 852–53 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by 
Blackmun, J.) (“[F]idelity to precedent is part and parcel of a conception of the judiciary as a source of 
impersonal and reasoned judgments. Indeed, this function of stare decisis is in many respects even 
more critical in adjudication involving constitutional liberties . . . . [T]his Court can legitimately lay 
claim to compliance with its directives only if the public understands the Court to be implementing 
principles founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals.” (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 333. United States v. Green, 389 F. Supp. 2d 29, 51 (D. Mass. 2005).  
 334. To the extent that courts are routinely denying cross-section claims, see supra note 17, the 
indication is that they are not erring on the side of defendants. See generally Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 
493, 504 (1972) (holding in a pre-Duren equal protection case that, “[i]n light of the great potential for 
harm latent in an unconstitutional jury-selection system, and the strong interest of the criminal 
defendant in avoiding that harm, any doubt should be resolved in favor of giving the opportunity for 
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may be making this mistake,336 and what is the best way to remedy the 
problem.337 As this Article demonstrates, however, courts must be more 
circumspect in their analysis of fair cross-section claims. Defendants’ 
unique Sixth Amendment rights are jeopardized each time a court 
contaminates Duren’s standard for systematic exclusion with either the 
discrimination requirement or conceptual focus of equal protection. 
Appendix 
To produce the survey for this Article, I examined all opinions 
decided by state supreme courts or federal circuit courts of appeals from 
January 1, 2000, to July 30, 2011, that cited the case of Duren v. 
Missouri.338 This search produced a total of 181 cases. From this list I 
omitted 44 cases that did not actually address the Sixth Amendment’s 
fair cross-section standard. Specifically, I omitted (a) six federal and state 
cases where, although the court included a citation to Duren, there was 
no fair cross-section claim at issue; (b) three federal cases decided 
exclusively under the Jury Service and Selection Act (“JSSA”)339 and 
three state cases decided exclusively under state statutes; (c) one federal 
case and three state cases where Duren was cited in the context of a 
claim exclusively about the defendant’s entitlement to discovery; (d) one 
federal case and two state cases where the decision was addressed on 
appeal by another case in the survey or by the United States Supreme 
Court; (e) one federal and one state case where Duren was cited only by 
the dissent; (f) four state cases denying an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim with no discussion of the underlying fair cross-section 
claim, other than stating that the defendant had failed to make out a 
prima facie case; (g) three state cases granting or denying a Certificate of 
Appeal with no discussion of the fair cross-section claim; (h) three 
federal cases where the fair cross-section claim was barred or waived and 
the merits of claim were not considered; and (i) one federal civil case. 
This process produced a list (which I refer to as the “federal and state 
Duren-citing list”) of 137 cases. 
 
challenging the jury to too many defendants, rather than giving it to too few” (footnote omitted)). 
 335. My survey represents a first foray into answering this question, but the limitations of the 
survey to cases that cite Duren and federal cases that discuss a fair cross-section, see infra Appendix, 
limit my ability to extrapolate from my results. 
 336. See supra Part III.C. 
 337. For some innovative suggestions, see Leslie Ellis & Shari Seidman Diamond, Race, Diversity, 
and Jury Composition: Battering and Bolstering Legitimacy, 78 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1033, 1053–58 
(2003); Hannaford-Agor, supra note 17, at 779–88; G. Thomas Munsterman & Janice T. Munsterman, 
The Search for Jury Representativeness, 2 Just. Sys. J. 59, 74 (1986). 
 338. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979). 
 339. Jury Selection Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861–78 (2006).  
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Second, I searched for federal circuit court cases, also post-January 
1, 2000, using the terms (fair /s (cross /2 section)) % Duren. This resulted 
in a list of 124 cases (which I refer to as the “federal search terms list”), 
only 30 of which actually addressed the merits of fair cross-section 
claims. Of the remaining 94 cases, 20 considered jury selection at the 
petit jury stage (i.e., preemptory strikes); 22 referred to the fair cross-
section right but did not address the merits of a Sixth Amendment claim 
(that is, they addressed only discovery, or a claim under the JSSA, or 
concluded that the cross-section claim was time-barred); 51 did not 
involve a fair cross-section claim in any way (that is, they used the 
language in another substantive context); and one case was a prior 
decision in a case that was already included in the survey. I did not 
examine state cases that were identified by these search terms. The 
combination of the “federal and state Duren-citing list” and the “federal 
search terms list” produced the master list of 167 cases. 
The master list of 167 cases does not capture every case that 
addresses the fair cross-section issue. It excludes cases not decided 
between 2000 and 2011, state cases that do not cite Duren, cases that 
neither cite Duren nor refer to a fair cross-section,340 cases that were not 
available on Westlaw, and any trial decisions that were not appealed. 
These limitations are the reason I use the survey to highlight troubling 
trends, rather than to make assertions that depend on exact figures or to 
extrapolate from my findings. 
With regard to the coding of cases included in the survey, 152 of the 
167 cases in the survey were coded first by a research assistant and a 
second time by me. The coding was not blind; I had access to the 
research assistant’s coding when I read the cases and coded it myself. 
Fifteen of the 167 cases in the chart were coded only by me. With regard 
to the cases omitted from the “federal and state Duren-citing list,” each 
of the 16 omitted federal circuit court cases and the 28 omitted state 
supreme court cases were read and reviewed first by a research assistant 
and a second time by me. With regard to the “federal search terms list,” 
only 8 of the 95 omitted cases were read and reviewed separately by a 
research assistant and by me; the remaining 87 cases were omitted by a 
research assistant on the basis of my instructions to omit cases that did 
not consider the merits of a Sixth Amendment fair cross-section claim. 
Finally, the percentages referenced in this Article have been 
rounded up or down for readability. For example, 0.438 is rounded up to 
44% and 0.434 is rounded down to 43%. 
 
 340. See, e.g., Hearn v. Cockrell, No. 02-10913, 2003 WL 21756441, at *5–6 (5th Cir. June 23, 2003) 
(concluding that the underrepresentation alleged by defendant was not unconstitutional, referring to 
the requirement of a “representative cross-section” and citing only Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 
528 (1975)). 
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I welcome questions and criticism of the survey methodology, and 
am happy to share case citations and a full record of my coding with any 
interested readers. Please contact me at nina.chernoff@law.cuny.edu for 
more information. 
